Management Compensation, Insider Trading and Lobbying Choice: The Case of R & D
In this study we examine the consistency between lobbying choices and insider trading behaviour by managers before and after the issuance of the 1974 FASB Exposure Draft on R&D. The results, though not very strong, indicate that managers compensated by accounting-based schemes lobbied against the FASB 1974 Exposure Draft on R&D and sold the shares of their firms, while managers compensated by market-based schemes lobbied for and bought shares of their firms. These results provide additional evidence that managers' lobbying choice can act as a surrogate for their beliefs as reflected in their insider trading behaviour. © 1990, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
Australian Journal of Management
Feroz, Ehsan H. and Hagerman, Robert L., "Management Compensation, Insider Trading and Lobbying Choice: The Case of R & D" (1990). Business Publications. 166.
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