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Fall 2014
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Introduction: a new geopolitics for learning?

One of the most provocative ideas to emerge in recent years has been Alan Scott’s (2001) central claim that a new meta-geography of global city-regions is steadily coalescing in the world. Exactly what Scott means by this notion of the city-region is still elusive, though. As far as I know, we do not yet possess a comprehensive typology of its multiple and surely fast-mutating spatialities. The concept seems to apply to dozens of urban areas impacted quite differently by globalization: viz. to the intra-national urban networks of Greater Zurich or the Randstad (Sassen, 2001); to the inter-national networks of the Yellow Sea Cooperation Zone (Friedmann, 2001); and finally to the “areal city-regions” of Cape Town and Puget Sound, each relatively contiguous, if highly uneven, physical fields of roughly three million people that occupy my central attention later in this paper.

Despite this ambiguity, Scott’s central claim is fascinating because it amounts to a new and potentially radical geopolitics capable, at least in theory, of nurturing a number of important projects (cf. Agnew 2002). Most profoundly, if for the moment least likely in the post-9/11 era, a global future progressively characterized and motored by city-regions might actually offer something liberating to those sceptical of, hostile to, or suffering from, the putative benefits associated with membership in the territorial (i.e. genetically Western) state, which arguably has worked rather poorly in a majority of those zones upon which it has been aggressively grafted (including much of Africa and the Middle East) [Footnote 1].

But there is also a more immediate project opened up by Scott’s geopolitical imagination – one that I wish to reference here at the outset. By challenging our older conception of a core-periphery hierarchy à la world systems theory with a flatter geography of imminent, experimenting, city-regions, he also challenges the spatial direction of learning. Instead of a world where an “advanced” North – ahead in time and thus ahead in space – teaches through diffusion a “trailing” South, Scott’s geopolitics suggest that lessons can, should and increasingly will come from most anywhere. On this reading, “Southern” city-regions like Cape Town might actually have lots of lessons to teach “Northern” city-regions like Puget Sound, if only we can adopt an analytical posture that suggests such a developmental possibility for urban learning. This is not to argue that the reverse is no longer true. One need only consider, for example, urban South Africa’s rather frenzied interest in Business Improvement Districts (originally a Canadian idea that like basketball the Americans re-engineered, picked up and ran with). But it does suggest that we spend much more time thinking about the distinctive modernities and institutional experimentations of the erstwhile South, especially where these emerge in urbanized spaces – long the epicentres of “newness” in the world (Jacobs 1969).

This is my main intention here. I ultimately interrogate the post-apartheid era in Cape Town (1994-2000) in terms of the local governance lessons this era might have for the contemporary institutional situation in “Puget Sound,” a city-region that is quite literally at the opposite end of the world but that, nonetheless, shares some commonalities with Cape Town. However, before I discuss Puget Sound and Cape Town in the main body of the paper I first lay out the idea(1) of the city-region, focusing in particular on the re-scaling of politics that this new spatial formation seems to suggest.
Theoretical considerations: city-regions and the “re-scaling” of politics?

The consolidation of the (European) nation-state undoubtedly constitutes one of the crucial developments in world history. Like many developments, though, some now believe that the nation-state carries within itself the strange logic of its own demise. In particular, the global world that nation-states have helped to occasion over the past several decades may be, paradoxically, “hollowing out” these same states (Guéhenno 1995). This is true for even powerful nation-states like the USA, whose neo-liberal rationalities have actively legitimated and normalized this process. In particular, the rise of supra-national institutions, especially the EU, has led a number of authors to re-consider the actual and potential relevance of new scales for effective governance, social regulation and political identity. On this reading, new “post-national” geographies of various kinds are slowly emerging – and more than that should emerge (Omae 1995).

The “city-region,” forged mainly out of the economic benefits associated with specialized, post-Fordist, industrial clustering (viz. increasing returns to scale, untraded interdependencies; trust; and so on), is one such geography (Storper and Scott 1986); (Gordon and McCann 2000). Again, Alan Scott has been especially assertive in drawing theoretical attention to the economic importance of city-regions, particularly those he considers “global”; but he is not alone. A fresh literature on “polycentric urban regions” (PUR) highlights similar themes, even as most PUR authors acknowledge the importance of earlier work by Jean (Gottman 1961), Alan (Pred 1977) and (Friedmann and Miller 1965) that relates to what the latter authors dubbed “the urban field.”

PUR scholars move beyond the mono-centric models of industrial (sub-) urbanization. However, as (Kloosterman and Musterd 2001) observe, “…concrete operationalisa-

[Footnote 1]

Here the reader might also consider the interesting essay on global city-regions by one of North America’s more unusual politicians, the Canadian separatist Lucien Bouchard (2001), who sees this concept from the perspective on an aspiring (urban) Quebec.

As a result, there is no single “Chicago-like” map that essentializes the city-region. But there is arguably a meta-logic or at least a rough grammar to these new spatial formations, which like Latin syntax can spawn a myriad of different manifestations, a “family resemblance” of urban landscapes. In charting the differences between the global city and the global city-region, for example, Peter (Hall 2001) identifies six seminal spaces, though many of these do not apply to Kinshasa or Puket: (1) the traditional downtown center, increasingly embellished to accommodate global tourism and cultural activities; (2) the newer business centers of the service economy, often appearing in older residential areas; (3) the “internal” edge city, such as London Docklands or La Défence in Paris; (4) the “external edge city,” frequently located near major transporta-
tion infrastructures; (5) the “outermost” edge city complex for back-offices; and (6) specialized (sub)centers, including rehabilitated zones for education, sports or theatre.

Extending his earlier work, John Friedmann (2002) takes this analysis even further. He draws on the scholarship of Klaus Kunzmann to chart an emerging “spatial structure of the European city-region in the 1990s.” This spatial structure includes many of the nodes identified by Hall, albeit with different names, but also a host of other contemporary realms, including “urban backwater space,” which suggests a disarticulated “field” more than an articulated “node.” Friedmann’s mapping exercise is particularly useful for my purposes here because it is embedded within a larger analysis of governance. For Friedmann, the “prospect of cities” — and here he means all cities — depends crucially on the strategic decisions that actors make in regards to urban development, i.e. on the politics of city-regions. Two models are available.

One the one hand, Friedmann argues, strategies may follow a “city-marketing” model. Here urban development per se is taken to be exogenous in origin and thus necessarily focused on attracting external capital, which will (in theory) maximize economic growth and eventually cascade down through society via enhanced local job creation. As Friedmann puts it: “[b]ecause there is only so much global capital to go around…if your city doesn’t latch on to it, some other city will: city-marketing is a zero-sum game” (p. 21). The “rules” of this game are familiar -- wage suppression; labor force compliance; streamlined local administration; tax breaks; subsidized land -- and indeed help to produce the “nodes” and “fields” just outlined. More, the power base is often shockingly narrow and anti-democratic: a tight alliance of trans-national business elites and city government officials. In simple terms: neoliberalism at the urban scale (Brenner and Theodore 2002). [Footnote 2]

In contrast, friedmann argues, there is an alternative, much more progressive, strategy for urban development (see also Friedmann 1992). Interestingly, he calls this the “quasi city-state” model, a neo-anarchistic term whose bloodlines bind friedmann’s politics to the earlier idea(l)s of lewis mumford and patrick geddes, of which more in a moment. For friedman, the “relatively autonomous quasi-city-state” provides a much more effective model for the governance of city-regions because just development — my term, not his -- is necessarily (1) endogenous (2) collaborative and (3) sustainable (p. 23-25). While the sustainability mantra may not stimulate much disagreement, the first two are more controversial.

There are two main reasons why. First, endogenous and collaborative development implies that city-regions are, as Friedmann puts it, “collective actors” (cf. Tilley 1974). This may under-estimate the class, gender and race cleavages within city-regions even as it over-estimates the possibilities of placed-based community of any kind, much less a progressive community. This leads to a second main concern with Friedmann’s preferred model: it tends to reify a sense of “the urban” as a bounded “object” that can be managed by “relatively autonomous” local actors. As Ash Amin (2002) puts it: the globalizing city(region) is increasingly “unbounded”; it is not an object per se, but a set of

[Footnote 2]

In one of the few treatises on neoliberalism at the urban scale, Brenner and Theodore add several other “rules,” many of which do not emanate with urban elites per se: e.g. dismantling of central government support for municipal activities; decentralization of welfarist responsibilities; creation of special revenue collection districts, etc. (p. 369)
relationships that stretch from, through, and often well beyond “the city” as a poly-nucleated physical “thing.” Here the city(region) is not a “field” but a “topology,” or more properly, a thousand topologies winding their way through the everyday performances that hew out the mutable urban. The topology metaphor, drawn from actor-network theory, suggests a relational (stretched) rather than relative (nested) conceptualization of scale. In my view, there is much to recommend this particular conceptualization; it is often useful to think of scale in terms of “stretching” lines of force rather than nested containers of objects. However, there are serious weaknesses as well: the topology of the actor-network in particular gives us only a vague sense of politics and normative ethics. Actor-networks often tell us what is happening, but not always what is to be done.

For all its faults, then, Friedmann’s politics are compelling because they are tied to an older, if too often neglected, tradition in geography and planning: neo-anarchism and eco-regional planning. Friedmann’s elevation of “sustainability” in his urban development triptych – his emphasis on the foundational notion of wealth creation through local-natural as opposed to external-financial capital – does not draw explicitly on Mumford or Geddes, but the traces of this particular lineage are strong, particularly in Friedmann’s radical interpretation of “planning.” Though planning today has a rather technical and narrow meaning, it was not always thus. As (Luccarelli 1995) documents, Mumford developed Geddes’ hypothesis that “evolution” (what we would today call “social learning”) occurs through rolling civic participation in the “survey” of a region’s resources, possibilities, mythical places, symbolic zones (what Lefebvre (1991) later called the representational space of radical possibility).

It is a mistake to dismiss this Geddes-Mumford tradition as unworkable in today’s worlds. It informs Pierre Clavel’s (Clavel 1985) analysis of the American “progressive city” phenomena from 1969 to 1984. Further, as Martha (Bianco 2001) shows, it was Portland’s belated “rediscovery” of Mumford’s (invited) recommendations for regional growth and development in 1938 that partly explains its contemporary reputation for progressive urbanization and environmental stewardship (Development 2000). Central to this reputation is Portland’s strong political architecture of regionalism, expressed through “Metro,” a regional governing and planning institution responsible for services to 1.3 million residents in three counties and 24 cities, including planning services and land-use information for local governments; prioritization and allocation of federal and state transportation funds; and business licence coordination. Importantly, Metro has a constituent model of governance: citizens are directly represented by an elected Council and Executive Director, which gives the body institutional teeth and constitutes a place-specific accumulation of social capital (Abbot and Abbot 2003).

Portland aside, the practical importance of a cooperative, sustainable, regionalist approach to Friedmann’s “quasi city-state” model lies in the proposition that it offers a plausible strategy for dealing with the most pressing political challenges of today’s city-regions. According to (Warner and Hefetz 2002): 70) these challenges are “…competitive and overlapping local governments, whose political boundaries reflect historical patterns but no longer coincide with the social, economic and ecological boundaries of the metropolitan area.” In the main, regional consolidation of institutional identities – i.e. the re-scaling of administrative systems to cohere with extant economic space (Bennett 2002) – promises more effective management of key urbanization issues: sprawl, ecological disintegration, uneven fiscal capacity and concentrated poverty (Erkip 2000). Of course public choice theorists challenge these apparently intuitive claims, arguing that market-based solutions improve implementation efficien-
cies through service privatisation and/or through inter-
municipal cooperation (the creation of “public markets”).
Yet even if “private” and “public” markets do improve
service efficiencies, contract oversight by public authorities
may mitigate much of these gains. Worse, as (Warner and
Hefetz 2002) show, market approaches do not build equity
and voice. “Markets,” in other words, “do not build com-
community” (p. 84).

“Community” is simply a relational effect of shared identi-
ties, including city-regional identities. It is important to note
that Marxists prefer “consciousness” to “identity” as the
former suggests the putative priority of class relations in the
political economy of urbanization. And certainly “class”
is crucial in the formation of political loyalties and social
affinities; but it often merges with a host of other claims on
human beings, including gender, race and place-based
claims (Cooke 1985). Within this context, it is plausible
to argue that the successful formation of a city-regional
identity is a crucial pre-condition to the collaborative
(though not necessarily conflict-free) politics of Friedmann’s
quasi-city-state. But how does this happen? Where does
such an identity come from? In one sense, these questions
seem well beyond the parameters of a conference paper.
But in another sense, they are straightforward. They come
from simply getting on with things! In their recent analysis
of the relationship between “regional identity” and the stra-
tegic management and governance of PURs, (van Houtum
and Lagendijk 2001) getting on with things is fundamen-
tally dialectical:
PURs develop and position themselves through a process
of regional identification, in which labelling (“Randstad,
‘Flemish Diamond’) and the setting of common images,
perspectives and goals play an essential role. […] A re-
gion will have its own identity if it is different from others in
terms of its politically induced strategic plans, its believed
or produced cultural assets [as well as] its functional/mor-
phological dimensions (p. 752).

Here regional identity emerges through an induced re-
scaling of the political imagination -- through what Lefe-
bvre (1991) theorized as the dominant “moment” in the
production and stabilization of new spaces: the act of
representation itself.

Following Friedmann, then, city-regions possess embryonic
potential for “collective action” whilst political regionalism
is the preferred way to unlock this potential (cf. (Calthorpe
and Fulton 2001). But the dangers are everywhere. “Re-
gionalism” per se can slip quickly into corporate-based
boosterism rather than civic-driven participation, as
Philadelphia in the 1990s seems to show. In fin-de-siècle
Philadelphia, “city-marketing” targeted capital accumula-
tion in (Peter Hall’s) city-regional “nodes”; endogenous
efforts that targeted (John Friedmann’s) “urban backwater”
were conspicuously absent. As one businesswoman bluntly
put it: “Regionalism is not about inner-city guilt or helping
the poor. It is about being able to compete in the world”
(Hodos 2002): 372). Accordingly, it is not just the pres-
ence of re-scaled institutions and identities that matters,
but the constitution and objectives of these institutions and
identities, a point made quite eloquently by (Pastor and al.
2000) in their analysis of “regions that work.”

To recapitulate this theoretical discussion before moving
on, then, the global emergence of polycentric “city-re-
gions” – now full of heterogeneous spaces -- suggests new
governance opportunities in the coming decades, opportu-
nities which arguably require a fundamental re-scaling of
our political capabilities in the service of a more cohesive
city-regional identity. Following Friedmann’s analysis, two
main models are available. The first model is unapologeti-
cally neoliberal and – for this reason – cannot possibly
promote just urban development (Cox and Watt 2002).
The second model, rooted in the radical “planning” tradi-
tions of Geddes and Mumford, argues for an endogenous, collaborative and sustainable agenda. Such an alternative approach, however precarious and neo-utopian, hypothetically forges an organic sense of place-based identity – a regional community for participatory urban development and planning. With all this in mind, then, we might fruitfully explore the geography and governance experiences of two city-regions at the opposite ends of the world: Puget Sound and Cape Town – eventually interrogating how the former might learn from the latter as both search for new urban development strategies.

Post-Fordist Puget Sound: urban geographies and governance

Located in the majestic Pacific Northwest, between the Cascade and Olympic mountains, “Puget Sound” has evolved in recent years into a “city-region”, albeit one forged from the steady conurbation of three, historically distinct, “cities”: Seattle, Tacoma and Everett (Moudon and Heckmann 2000). Like Cape Town, Puget Sound is home to some three million people. This population constitutes 60% of the state’s overall population and is predominantly white. That said, like other urban places in America, Puget Sound has sizable populations of Latinos, African-Americans and Asians. The region awkwardly spans four counties and seventy odd incorporated municipalities.

To outsiders, “Puget Sound” – and particularly Seattle-Redmond, where Bill Gates lives -- has an overwhelmingly “high-tech” geography. There is good reason for this: from 1995 to 1998, at the zenith of the New Economy, local high-tech employment grew twice as fast as the national rate (11.2% to 5.3% per annum, respectively). Following (Warner and Hefetz 2002), though, this rapid growth produced an economic reality sharply at odds with the slower-moving cultural and political institutions of the region, of which more below. As one report put it:

High tech employment is [now the] major force in establishing the region as a global center in a rapidly changing world economy. [...] And technology employment is rapidly changing the region’s landscape. Employment in high technology is scattered throughout the region’s four counties, ignoring county and city lines and establishing a truly regional presence (Council 1999).

Adding Microsoft, Amazon, Adobe, Starbucks, and new biotech companies, amongst others, to the famous “Boeing base” – which produced two-thirds of the world’s large commercial aircraft in the late 1990s (Unknown 1997) – has generated rapid demographic growth (3% more people in the region per annum in recent years). Along with sprawl, this has generated demands for new kinds of commercial, cultural, retail and environmental amenities. Seattle’s CBD, for example, has maintained about 35% of the city’s jobs (unusually high for US cities), although the wider space-economy has also produced plenty of “edge space”, including Bellevue, which neatly fits the “Edge City” syntax originally identified by Joel (Garreau 1991). Still other spatial transformations of note include the re-engineering of downtown Tacoma, an older industrial port city in the Southern part of the region. In the late 1990s, Tacoma invested a billion dollars of public and private money. Significant projects have included a branch campus of the University of Washington, a waterfront esplanade, two major art museums, a light-rail line, new condo/apartments, and a convention center/hotel complex – a “culture-led”/“leisure space” strategy of urban renewal many US downtowns have tried in recent years (Strom 2002).

The high-tech luster has faded somewhat in the current economy, although the writing was already on the wall before 9/11. In March 2001, for example, Boeing an-
nounced that it would relocate its corporate headquarters to Chicago, sending fears that aerospace jobs -- and their 3.14 multiple effect -- would follow in the coming years. The “Boeing bomb” was widely interpreted as a wake-up call, particularly in the popular press. The region, it is increasingly suggested, can no longer take itself for granted. In particular, problems associated with rapid, post-Fordist urbanization – especially transportation chaos – are considered potential “death-blow” challenges. Recent articles in the mainstream press compare Seattle/Puget Sound negatively with Vancouver and Portland. As one reporter commented:

With our Space Needle and sports teams, Pike Place Market and gorgeous geography, Boeing and Microsoft, Starbucks and Amazon, Seattle likes to think of itself as top dog in the Pacific Northwest. But when it comes to liveability we seem stuck in first gear. [...] Just ask around. “I think Seattle’s in big trouble,” says Gordon Price, a city councilor in Vancouver. “There’s no fallback except having to live with congestion” (Dietrich 2/3/02).

Notwithstanding the journalistic hype, the concern that “Seattle’s in big trouble” directly challenges external assumptions about Puget Sound. One of these assumptions is that, in the governance arena, the region has a “progressive model” from which others might learn. The reasoning is three-fold. First, as a result of the 1991 Growth Management Act (GMA), Puget Sound’s counties and municipals have all successfully drafted comprehensive development plans. These plans will reinforce existing activity centres, and thus help to implode growth within the region’s urban growth boundary – “the ring around the region” celebrated by Planning. Second, Puget Sound has formed a four-county regional transit authority – SoundTransit – that will inexorably reinforce new development within this “ring” and weigh the region off the automobile. Third, regional management is formally abetted by the Puget Sound Regional Council, a council of governments that brokers information and provide institutional coordination between jurisdictions. However, there are three major signs that things are not as rosy as all this suggests.

First, despite the comprehensive planning mandate, governance relationships between municipals and counties and as well as between municipalities within and across counties remains competitive rather than broadly collaborative. Part of this relates to classic land-use politics: in one ex-urban case, for example, a lengthy community planning process was nearly torpedoed by the Master Builders Association. A more significant factor, though, is the uncomfortable new political culture of scale, i.e. of simultaneously nesting and cross-linking “community plans” into the much wider spatial agendas of regional growth management. This was apparent in a “Safe Haven” forum organized recently by the University of Washington, Tacoma and Pierce County Planning and Land Services. [Footnote 3] During the forum, citizens-volunteers involved in planning elaborated on their perceptions of the overall process. One volunteer noted she was from the mental health

[Footnote 3]
This forum, moderated by the Director of the Urban Studies program at the University of Washington, Tacoma, was held on the evening on February 13, 2003. The purpose of the forum was to unpack the difficulties associated with municipal-County relations. At a working lunch held before the forum, the Director of Planning for Pierce County wondered how to reduce conflict. I suggested that, given the development models we have, conflict is unavoidable -- why not start with the presumption of conflict? The Director responded this way: “I have never thought about approaching things like that before; perhaps you are right – perhaps that’s the right way to go about getting through this.”
field, “which has proven useful.” Another reported that he had long experience in public issues but “there was a little less room for maneuver than we all thought.” Still another noted that she felt most disappointed “anytime we had to deal with other jurisdictions.” An elderly woman concurred and added that, though the process kept her hopeful, “I’m not convinced we’re building a real community here.” Finally, the forum received a thoughtful denouement: “This kind of planning,” the participant intoned, “is new in our history. It’s antithetical to our American values – to our rugged individualism. But we have to think about the Earth itself.”

Second, and related to the first point, Puget Sound has proved profoundly unable (so far) to wean itself off the private automobile; in consequence, it has the third worst congestion problems in the country. About 65% of individuals work outside the community in which they live. Yet efforts to promote regional transportation confront political parochialism and pro-car initiatives almost daily. To cite but one example, officials in Renton, an important community in Puget Sound, stalled the sale of a small parcel appraised at only $30,000 to Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway in June 2002. The railway, whose tracks carry the “Sounder” commuter trains between Tacoma and Seattle, needed the land for safety improvements. The Mayor wanted the tax money for “local” issues.

Finally, and flowing out of the first two points, despite the urgent need to construct a supra-local political identity, to embrace the Geddes/Mumford tradition of regionalism outlined earlier in this paper, municipal incorporations have actually increased in the 1990s, the putative decade of regional growth management! Indeed, new “cities” – if that is the right term -- appear almost every year, even though “…the proliferation of jurisdictions …greatly complicates regional management as intended by the plans” (Moudon and Heckmann 2000). More, these new (suburban) “cities” often occlude affordable housing goals through exclusionary zoning practices, which Moudon and Heckman (Moudon and Heckmann 2000) identify as Puget Sound’s hidden “Achilles heel.” Indeed, they ultimately argue that Puget Sound can only avoid “Los Angelization” – the spatial specter that seems to haunt both Puget Sound and Cape Town -- if “…the concept of Cascadia evolves into a physical and economic reality” (p. 133).

Why, then, is the region “stuck in first gear”? Why is the re-scaling opportunity stalled? While such questions deserve a great deal more thought – and empirical evidence -- than I can provide here, one hypothesis does seem to fit the facts: Puget Sound is in trouble because most of its communities have adopted Friedmann’s “city-marketing” model of urban development, where wealth is “invited in” through strategies for global “competitiveness” and “entrepreneurial” governance. On this reading, it is unsurprising that Puget Sound as a whole labours to construct sustainable regionalism with unsustainable neoliberal tools. By emphasising “competitiveness” in particular it undermines the rationalities of “collaboration” – and ultimately of the new communities of affection that Friedmann’s “quasi-city state” model demands. The question, then, is not whether “Cascadia evolves into a physical and economic reality.” In fact, that has already happened, partly for the reasons Alan Scott et al. have begun to elaborate. The question is whether a new political reality – a re-scaled progressive regionalism -- can “grow over” and successfully govern this physical and economic reality. It is precisely here, I shall positively argue, that Puget Sound might look to post-apartheid Cape Town for interesting lessons. But Cape Town itself struggles with the spatial manifestations of competitive neo-liberalism. Here too there is a lesson, although it is hardly a positive one. Two lessons, then: one negative and one positive. Let me conclude the paper with a brief elaboration of these lessons, using Cape Town emerging spatialities as the platform for this discussion.

Learning from Cape Town’s spatialities?
Located near the Cape of Good Hope, alongside the place-defining majesty of Table Mountain, “Cape Town” might also be conceived as one of South Africa’s three (global?) city-regions (Simmons and Hack 2000: 5).

Today it is home to about three million people, the majority of whom are identified locally as Coloured rather than African, Indian/Asian or white. Built up like Puget Sound from an original maritime function, Cape Town’s geography nonetheless mostly reflects (1) apartheid; and (2) economic globalisation, particularly global tourism. Map 1 below charts a few of the “spaces” of Cape Town as an emerging city-region. We need not “sugar-coat” this (partial) mapping. For the majority of Cape Town’s residents still live in what might be called the space of apartheid under-development. This space developed originally from the practices attending urban agglomeration, modernist planning and, of course, apartheid ideology itself. In geographical terms, dramatic “buffer zones” separate low-density, poverty-ridden, housing tracts that are, in turn, located far away from major employment centres (including the CBD, Claremont and Belville employment “cores”). African areas within apartheid space, which were supposed to “whither away” with the promulgation of the Coloured Labour Preference Area in 1955, simply “wedged through” the region, spreading towards the Southeast in ever-larger residential swaths punctuated today by “squatterscapes” in various stages of consolidation.

The burgeoning informality of its political, economic and physical structure undoubtedly constitutes Cape Town most daunting long-term challenge, a reality that needs a great deal more research in the coming years (Dierwechter 2002; 2003). As (Jenkins and Wilkinson 2001) conclude in their recent discussion of this challenge:

In the final analysis…it is probable that Cape Town will continue to remain divided into two zones: one of relative wealth and formal economic opportunity and one of relative poverty, where the informal societal order prevails (p._ ).

While the “informal societal order” may (or may not) be a local example of Friedmann’s “urban backwaters,” the “economic opportunity” Jenkins and Wilson refer to is tied directly to Cape Town’s latest articulation with global circuits of wealth creation, especially tourist circuits. The ornamentation of Cape Town’s waterfront – its dramatic re-production as “leisure space” -- is the most celebrated example of this articulation (Kilian and Dodson 1996; Goudie, Khan et al. 1999). But there are other examples too, including new gambling zones and the “theme-o-centric” amusement/business complex at Century City/Ratanga Junction just off the N1 (Hannigan 1998). The latter is a special type of Hall’s “edge space,” the majority of which is far less spectacular commercial development that, according to Vanessa Watson (Watson 2000), has decentralized rapidly in recent years from the three historic cores, including the CBD core. Much of this has mutated into “gated space,” joining an even greater number of gated residential areas. For many, this new privatopia and surveillance space suggests that Cape Town is emerging as a “fortress city,” much like Los Angeles or Sao Paolo (Robins 2002).

This last point runs the grave epistemological risk of any mapping exercise (like the above one) that isolates similar spaces – global spaces, backwater spaces, edge space, leisure spaces, fortress spaces -- and then over-generalizes their meaning for a whole city. Amin and Graham (1997) call this the problem of synecdoche – of taking the part to represent the whole. At the same time, the simultaneous emergence of these spaces – which no geographer can possibly ignore -- also provides the basis for our first lesson. It is not a positive lesson, but it is, I hope, instructive all the same. This lesson relates to the serious limitations of the neo-liberal city-marketing model of urban development that, I suggested earlier, Puget Sound is also following.
Cape Town’s emerging spatialities dramatize these lessons, holding them out for others to see in fairly stark form: didactic, raw, open. Simply put, this spatiality reflects a house divided: one oriented towards global modernity, the other towards apartheid under-development. Fortress space emerges as a hopelessly unsustainable “solution” – a Mason-Dixon line that staves off the quiet desperation of a civil war between two incompatible socio-economic
tions not neoliberal imperfections. But if it turns out that we really do need a flatter geopolitics of global development then Cape Town’s spatialities become highly instructive for ALL city-regions vigorously pursuing the geography of external growth and competitive development. Puget Sound does not have informal squatter camps; it does not have the awesome spatial legacies of apartheid ideology. However, it does have its own zones of poverty and despair – often in the immediate shadow of its own “theme-o-centric” cathedrals of leisure and consumption; it has its own proliferating Edge and Fortress cities and its own gun problem. In this sense it well might look South – to Cape Town -- for images of its own neo-liberal future: a house divided that, to stay with the Lincolnian metaphor, cannot long stand.

Yet we cannot end things there. For there is, I would also argue, another epistemology of post-apartheid Cape Town, one that does not over-generalize the dualities of global modernity and apartheid under-development, however important these two realities may be to the story of this city. It is hard to draw maps with this “other” epistemology because, as Jenny Robinson suggests, it lies somewhere “between” modernity and development – perhaps in the radical “spaces of representation” that Lefebvre (1991) envisaged. But we can try to locate these spaces as best we can, perhaps using traditions of urban thought neglected in recent years, such as those associated with Geddes and Mumford detailed earlier. When we do so, I think Puget Sound might draw much more positive lessons from Cape Town’s recent experimentations, especially its political experimentations. For above all else, Cape Town has re-scaled its governance structures – and with utterly remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, speed (Cameron 1999). Unlike Puget Sound, which suffers from local institutional chaos, Cape Town has created a single gover-
nance realm for the negotiation of its future urban development trajectory – for placed-based collaboration about the endogenous assets that might be deployed for a more sustainable tomorrow.

This new realm of city-regional governance -- where administrative and economic spaces “match up” -- guarantees nothing in itself. We need to be clear-eyed about this. City-regionalism is not genetically “progressive.” As many scholars have argued of late, the city-region is a socially constructed scale – and thus reproductive of the groups who do the constructing (Brenner 2002). But Cape Town has made a start – and it is already possible to see the potentialities of its new governance structure. It has abetted innovative projects like the Wetton-Landsdowne-Corridor, which Roberts (2002) rightly calls “people-centred space” and which might also be theorised as a politically-induced representation of socio-spatial integration. Within this wider field of action there are even smaller, more ordinary, less flashy spaces – for example, spaces of informal sector development -- that drip with the endogenous, collaborative and sustainable potential of the “quasi-city-state” strategies Friedmann celebrates (Dierwechter 2001, 2003).

And again, while Puget Sound does not have large swaths of “informality,” it does have its own distinctive zones of neglected people and ignored assets. Accordingly, in so far as Puget Sound must engage with these zones if it is to build a just city-region, it may turn to Cape Town for political inspiration. For however submerged and precarious, Cape Town’s city-regionalism still retains the potential for something organic and true, rather than something imported and imitative.

Conclusions

In the headquote that opened this paper, I highlighted an ordinary, but stinging, critique of Puget Sound’s political and administrative geographies. If life does not improve in the region, we can expect such critiques may grow – perhaps enough to generate a different kind of politics. Following the synoptic theme of this session – “Learning from South Africa” – I have argued here that “Puget Sound” might look to “Cape Town’s” spatialities for strategic insight into such politics. I initially mobilized Alan Scott’s (geopolitical) argument that we pay more attention to global city-regions, suggesting that such regions change the direction of spatial learning by confronting the “core-periphery” spatialities of world history. I then elaborated upon the geography of city-regions, drawing not only upon the current literature but also upon an older tradition of urban thought that stretches back to the neo-anarchistic regionalism of Lewis Mumford and Patrick Geddes. I pulled these two literatures together by referencing John Friedmann’s propositions about urban development models -- the first neo-liberal, the second regionalist. Through a spatial exploration of Puget Sound and Cape Town, respectively, I subsequently used these models to highlight two lessons for Puget Sound. The first was negative, as it addressed the divided spatialities of Cape Town’s urban neoliberalism; the second was positive, finding inspiration in Cape Town’s remarkable political transformation, which, in my view, still retains the spatial possibilities for endogenous, collaborative and sustainable city-regions.
References


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