Marriage Market Values Systems and Global Gender Inequality

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Psychology & PPE
June, 2014

Faculty Adviser: Dr. Margaret Griesse

Essay completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Global Honors, University of Washington, Tacoma
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Approved:

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Faculty Adviser    Date

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Director, Global Honors   Date
Abstract

Marriage and gender inequality represent two nearly amaranthine worldwide conventions. This research looks to compare the relative local political economics of marriage with worldwide gender inequality. A comparison of United Nations gender inequality index ratings with this works duly established relative local marriage market gender equity values systems ratings indicate the presence of potentially significant correlation within these two data sets. This study concludes that these findings merit a more comprehensive look at prevailing global/local cultural marriage traditions and their potential relationship with the prevalence of worldwide gender inequality.

Keywords: marriage market, gender equity, bride price, dowry, groom price, partner price, marriage market gender equity value systems ratings (MMGEVS) United Nations Gender Inequality Index (UNGII)
Gender equity power flow dynamics, relative local marriage market values systems and worldwide gender inequality. The United Nations (2000, 2005 & 2010) affirms that gender inequality continues to be a significant issue throughout the world (UNWW). “Despite calls for gender equality, women are significantly under-represented in Governments, political parties and at the United Nations” as reported by the UNWW (2000, pg. 151). For example, “7 of 150 elected Heads of State in the world were women, and only 11 of 192 Heads of Government” (UNWW, 2010 pg. X).

In an effort to quantify worldwide gender inequality the United Nations have developed the Gender Inequality Index (2012). This rating, and ranking establishes a gender inequality score based on metrics from several other international studies. The UNGII-FAQ (2014) noted “The Gender Inequality Index is similar in method to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). It can be interpreted as a percentage loss to potential human development due to shortfalls in the dimensions included” such as, gender specific levels of access to society, health, economy, government (pg. 1).

Not one of the more than 200 participant countries attained a perfect gender equity score of zero. Furthermore, not one country was found to have a matriarchal society, all were found to be patriarchal, to varying degrees. Gender equity did not exist anywhere on the planet as rated by the United Nations (UNGII, 2012).

This work will investigate marriage and worldwide gender inequality; the gender power flow dynamics of culturally relevant local coupling observances, of bride price, dowry, courting, dating or the like, of marriage market values systems worldwide. What if any potential relationship(s) might these various coupling observances have with respects to predominant worldwide gender inequality? Whereas the various marriage associated observances differed
considerably throughout the world, marriage has remained a worldwide phenomenon, as does
gender inequality.

The glass slipper and the glass ceiling, are they one and the same? Socially manufactured
derivations of predominating gender constructs, which have emerged from the many various
cultural coupling observances’ deeply embedded traditions? Are these various cultural coupling
observances, or, relative local marriage market values systems, serving to perpetuate gender
inequality worldwide?

Three fundamental principles represent the theoretical grounding for this research. First,
that women are, or that the female gender construct is, subordinate to that of the male gender
construct. Second, that both men and women are, for all intents and purposes, a commodity.
Finally, that the commodification of men and women through the marriage market, represents a
significant social force capable of influencing and perpetuating worldwide systemic gender
inequality.

John Locke (circa 1690) exampled man and woman, husband and wife as the first civil
society: he expressed the idea that “Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between
man and woman” (as cited in MacPherson 1980, pg. 43). A western centric view point is one of
democratic ideals, that of a voluntary or equitably agreed upon conjugal society. None the less,
within these earliest of societies Locke did in fact cast the male as the leader over the female,
voluntary, patriarchal (MacPherson, 1980).

Whether or not the many various conjugal societies were or were not voluntary in nature,
and to what extent is not at issue for this specific research. At issue is the significance of the
observance itself, of relative local marriage market gender equity values systems worldwide,
pursuant to systemic global gender inequality. This research will not attempt to define voluntary
conjugal societies excepting as follows. The persistence of said observance(s) in any given collective, whether official or unofficial, would for the sake of this research render these various coupling observances more or less voluntary in nature.

Within the UN Gender Inequality Index (UNGII) there are some potential issues owing to possible western biases. The majority of the countries which scored lower, i.e. better; those collectives which afforded greater levels of female access or equality within their societies, according to the UNGII, were predominantly westernized; capitalist, democratic, developed. Furthermore, the countries or regions which ranked at the lower end of the UNGII scale tended towards developing, underdeveloped or undeveloped countries primarily. In addition, different cultures can have and do have different values, different priorities. Human rights, women’s rights, gender equity and or women’s access to society can and do have many different meanings within the many different social collectives around the globe.

The UN report continued with a mention of some of the limitations of the data as well; the UNGII was far from perfect, far from exacting and was limited in scope by numerous factors. Factors such as, using national governance participation rates rather than local governance participation rates in the index, and lacking a broader internationally agreed upon set of standards with which to work on many issues. These and many other difficulties limited the type, the quality and the amount of data collectable, and or useable. None the less the UNGII represents best available data pursuant to a practical measurement of worldwide gender inequality, using metrics which had been agreed to by a large number of countries throughout the world.

I will establish specific relative local coupling observance prevalence within each preliminary sample country selected for this work. Using these data I will then establish a
marriage market gender equity value system rating (MMGEVS): How much for the woman, or how much for the man, a partner price? This will be based on socio-expectational economic transfers measured as a percentage of individual annual earnings per capita within each sample country. Finally this data will be compared with data from the UNGII 2012 data. Can gender inequality data, as measured by the UNGII, be shown to potentially relate to resultant marriage market gender equity value systems ratings data?

What are the relative marriage market gender equity value scale ratings within each sample country? What is the UNGII rating of each sample country? And what if any potential corroboration can be found within these two data sets?

Participant countries were selected based on where they were rated on the UNGII 2012 scale; a broad spectrum of ratings was desired, as well as the availability of sufficient data, the specific type of relative local cultural coupling observances practiced; whether bride price, dowry, westernized dating or the like. Population size was important in that this research was attempting to look at larger worldwide trends. Further, a broad cross section of governance models, social and economic developmental levels, religious practices, and belief systems was desired. I will use India, China and the United States as my preliminary sample countries for this study.

Can relative cultural variance within these coupling observances; whether our own familiar westernized traditional dating and marriage observances, eastern bride price observances or dowry observances or the like; relative cultural marriage equity market value systems, be shown to correlate with relative global gender inequality worldwide? In any given society in which gender equity (women’s rights) is rated, whether lower or higher, can relative local culturally specific marriage market gender equity value scales ratings be shown to potentially
correspond with the various levels of gender equity as tracked and rated by the United Nations 2012 Gender Inequality Index (UNGII)?

India will be presented first, China second and the United States third; with respects to culturally specific coupling observances and gender specific economic socio-expectational flows; presented as a percentage of annual income within each sample country. These data sets will be used to establish MMGEVS ratings for each sample country. A gross value set will be determined, based on local relative normative expectations. In addition, an adjusted value set will be determined, based on approximated real world social practices. This value set will represent net MMGEVS ratings. The forth section will be a comparison of the two data sets: The UNGII rating for each of the three sample countries, and the resultant MMGEVS ratings for each sample country. In the final section I will present discussion and conclusion(s).

India, dowry payment and marriage market values systems

India is reported as being a patriarchal society in which “…the secondary or powerless position of the Indian woman appears to be at the core of the problem” noted Banerjee (2013, pg. 38). The Indian marriage market is dominated by dowry payment (Sautmann, 2011; Bhat & Halli, 1999; Anderson, 2007). This is a reverse form of bride price (groom price) whereby the bride, or the bride’s family, pay the groom and or the groom’s family. The marriage itself will not take place until or unless the dowry has been paid and even then if the dowry was not deemed sufficient, following the marriage, more would be demanded and or expected.

Furthermore, dowry custom has maintained strong cultural support within India. Dowry has in fact become a commonly observed marriage custom in India affecting some “…93-94% of marriages, Anderson (2007a)” reported Sautmann (2011 pg. 6). This despite efforts from
government; which has officially prohibited Dowry in 1961, local social activists, feminist organizations and the like (Sautmann 2011, Banerjee, 2013).

The relative marriage market gender equity value system data for India was significantly influenced by an overabundance of women. Which had resulted in bride price deflation, or groom price hyperinflation; as opposed to a shortage of women, and an associated bride price hyper-inflation within China’s marriage market (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012; Bhat & Halli, 1999). This was the result of a marriage squeeze in India (Rao, 1993; Sautmann, 2011; Bhat & Halli, 1999).

While demographically males do outnumber females, this is not true of marriage age appropriate females, who actually outnumber marriage age appropriate males. A growing population and shifting economic demographics are among the causes of the rise in practice and price of Dowry in India (Bhat & Halli, 1999; Anderson, 2007). Reporting on several regions throughout India, Anderson (2007) declared that while exacting figures were not available dowry payments would commonly equate to “several times more than total annual household income…” (pg. 155).

Income within various regions of India differs considerably, just as within China and the United States of America. This study works to mitigate these incongruences by applying partner price as a percentage of annual per capita income for all sample countries, in order to establish local relative local (MMGEVS) ratings.

Anderson (2007) reported the rural region of Uttar Pradesh’ average dowry payments at 3 and 7 times the average annual male income, while in rural Karnataka dowry price averaged 6 times earnings. Further, dowry price for rural Tamil Nadu was reported at 8 time’s annual per capita income (Anderson, 2007). These were rural regions notably regarded as regions with
lower incomes than comparable urban regions within India. Delhi was the only major urban area specifically reported on, with a dowry price approximating 4 time’s annual per capita income (Anderson 2007). (See appendix A, chart 1.1)

In addition, MMGEVS ratings will be determined for three income levels. A lower level or rural average income level (L1), an upper or urban average income level (L3) and a mid-level income range (L2), an average of (L1) and (L3) values. Furthermore, a gross set of values and a net set of values will be determined. Whereas a gross value data set will represent general marriage market values systems local social expectations, a net value data set will represent an adjusted value based on real world practice.

Data pursuant to general marriage market social values systems normative gross social expectational results for India follow. Gross average dowry, groom price, or male partner price rating for the middle 1/3 income range (L2) was a resultant 5.0. Again this represents a female to male socio-expectational flow value or a groom price. Gross, unadjusted MMGEVS ratings for (L1) were a resultant 6.0, while (L3) the average urban or upper income level rating was 4.0. Cost expectancy ratios varied according to regional income levels. These values represent a percentage of annual income per capita. (L3) at 4.0 represents 400% of income, or four years’ worth of individual per capita earnings approximately, (L2) at 5.0 represents five times annual earnings and (L1) 6.0 represents a dowry price of 6 times average annual individual earnings within India. (See appendix A, chart 1.2)

Dowry practice prevalence in India has been reported at ± 93.5%. India’s net MMGEVS ratings will be adjusted to account for this difference in real world practice versus base social expectations. The resultant approximated net value represents a net gender specific female to male flow, a dowry payment, or groom price payment of 4.675 times approximate average
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annual per capita earnings (L2). With a lower income level value rating (L1) of 5.61 and an
upper level, or average urban income level value rating (L3) of 3.74. These values represent 5.6
and 3.74 times approximate annual earnings per capita. (See appendix A, chart 1.3, and
Appendix G, graph 1.4).

China, bride price and marriage market values systems

China has been described as a patrilineal society having a patrilocal marriage system- a
bride price system (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012; Zhang, 2000). Bride price is a well-
accepted and commonly observed practice within Chinese society. This owing as far back as the
Zhou dynasty; circa 1046 BCE to 246 BCE (Britannica, 2013). Jiang and Sanchez-Barricarte
(2012) reported “From that period on, the role and function of the bride price has never
weakened” (pg. 2). It has in fact not only remained a central core of marriage culture in China
but has increased in prevalence as market reforms have been instituted (Zhang, 2000). In
addition, there would be no marriage, no official engagement or the like, unless or until the bride
price was paid in full and in advance (Jiang & Sanchez, 2012).

“‘The prevalence of bride price in China is closely related to the surplus of males and the
lack of females’ (Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell, 1983; Chen, 2004)... in the marriage market, the
side of oversupply will compete for marriage at a cost” as Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte (2012)
noted (pg. 3). Basic supply and demand; females were in short supply and demand was
exceedingly high.

Jiang and Sanchez- Barricarte (2012) added “A preference for sons and discrimination
against daughters has long existed in China” (pg. 3). Efforts have been made by some Chinese to
move beyond bride price observances, affording a more equitable role for the female. None the
less, bride price has been increasing steadily in China (Zhang, 2000; Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012).

Relative bride price in Zhaocun village of Gansu Province was reported at approximately 15720y (Yuan) by the end of the 1990s, up from 2069y in the 1980s. Xiajia village of Heilongjiang Province, China was reported at 28,500y. In addition, Zhang (2000) writing on northern Chinese villages provided “In the early 1980s villagers spent 3000-4000 Yuan to arrange a son's marriage, ten years later, they needed to spend 15,000-26,000 Yuan” (pg. 62). Consequently, given corroborating data sets ranging from approximately 15,000y to 28,500y, these will be the gross figures used. (See appendix B, chart 2.1)

In addition, Zhang (2000) reported that around 25% of dowries brought into the marriage were at least equal to the average bride price payment during the 1980s, the earlier years of reform efforts in China. This number had reportedly grown to approximately 50% by the end of the 1990s (Zhang, 2000). These figures will be used for determining net MMGEVS ratings. (See appendix B, chart 2.1)

Resultant data represents relative local normative gross expectational and net real world approximated values. Gross bride price for (L1) was a resulting 15,000y and net (L1) was 11,250y; gross (L2) 21,750y, net (L2) 16,312y; gross (L3) 28,500y and net (L3) 21,375y. These value range data will then be adjusted as a percentage of annual income per capita, as reported by the Chinese Family Panel Studies at Peking University (Wong, 2013). (See appendix B, chart 2.1)

Annual per capita income for China was reported as 2100 US dollars, or about 13,122 Yuan (Wong, 2013). The average annual income in Shanghai, a large industrial coastal province, was reported at 29,000. Gansu, a northern inland province had a figure of 11,400y; with 16,247y
for an urban family and 9998y for a rural family being reported (Wong, 2013). Therefore these resulting values, lower and upper annual income range values (L1) 9,998y, and (L3) 29,000y will be used. In addition these two values will be averaged to produce (L2) 19,499y, an approximated mid-level income level value. These data will be used in order to establish MMGEVS ratings across various income levels, just as with all sample countries. (See appendix B, chart 2.2) Resultant gross MMGEVS ratings for China were 1.5 (L1), 1.12 (L2) and 0.98 (L3) respectively. Again, these values represent percentage multiples of annual income per capita (1x = 100% of APCI); (L1) 1.5 represents 1.5 times annual per capita income, (L2) 1.12 represents 1.12 times annual per capita income, and 0.98 represents 98% of annual individual earnings. (See appendix B, chart 2.3).

Finally, ± 90% bride price participation rates were reported, and approximately 1/2 of all bride price payments were made in full. An adjusted net average bride price or partner price will reflect these values as an approximated real world adjusted net value. Net (L2) or the middle income level 1/3 MMGEVS rating was a resultant 0.75, or 75% of annual per capita earnings. Net (L1) was a resultant 1.01 and (L3) 0.6634, or about 101% and 66% of approximate annual earnings per capita. (See appendix B chart 2.4 and appendix H, graph 2.5)

**Courting, dating, marriage market value systems and the United States**

What of western culture’s marriage customs or traditions. Does a relative local marriage market gender equity value system exist, in some form, within the developed world, within the U.S.? Does America have a bride price system, a dowry system or a socio-expectational gender neutral marriage market value system? Furthermore, was there any difference between U.S. traditional expectational memes and real world practice?
MMGEVS estimations will include formative conjugal society related expense items; considered normative pursuant to coupling observances in America; courtship, engagement ring, wedding ceremony and honeymoon expenses. Relative local U.S, social expectations, or gross values, and approximated real world values, net values, will be used just as with India and China. The intent is to provide two MMGEVS ratings data sets for each sample country. Gross MMGEVS ratings will be a result of associated normative gender specific expectations; Net MMGEVS ratings will be a result of normative approximated real world practices. What are the base social expectations and what are the actual expenses incurred as a percentage of annual earnings per capita?

What of courting costs, dating, do they represent a gender specific socio-expectational flow, in theory or in practice? The average length of engagement in America was reported at about fourteen months and seventeen months (The Knot, 2011; People, 2007). Whereas the male initially incurred the bulk of dating expenses, these expenses were generally shared more evenly as a relationship progressed. Further evidence suggests that individuals spend as much or more money prepping themselves for a date, both male and female; on clothing, hair, makeup and so forth (Whitelocks, 2014). Consequently, the expense of courting will be excluded; the expense was found to be an approximate socio-expectational and real world gender neutral flow. Wedding expenses and associated costs remain to be examined.

The cost of the average engagement ring in America was reported at $2,311 (Staff Amex, 2014). Further, American Express Spending & Savings Tracker (2014) reported an average engagement ring cost at $2410, and in the upper price range the average cost increased to $5,658 (as cited in Lit, Feb. 3). Max, (2014) reported that only about 16% of engagement ring costs were $5,000 or more (pg.1). Pardes (2014) added, of some 1500 adults surveyed about 25%
reported ring costs of $2,000 to $4,999, with some 38% of engagement ring cost at $1,000 dollars or less; the most common price range (Feb, 10). (See appendix C, chart 3.1)

U.S. social expectations charged the male with the engagement ring expense traditionally, a male to female socio-expectational flow (Staff E, 2013; The Knot, 2014). However, Hill (2013) reported that real world practice resulted in about 73% of grooms paying for the engagement ring themselves (pg. 1). Marcus (2013) cited a poll of more than 12,000 respondents with 55% expecting the male to pay for the ring while the other 45% would be willing to share the cost (pg. 1). These will be the engagement ring expense related figures used for adjusted net U.S. MMGEVS ratings assessments; as an overall positive economic transfer from the male social construct towards the female social construct. (See appendix C, chart 3.11)

In addition to these costs there is the wedding itself. The average cost of a wedding in 2012 was reported at about $27,600, while a median was calculated at $10,000 (Oremus, 2013 pg. 2). Staff C (2014) reported the average cost of a wedding in America at $25,200, and added that most weddings cost less than $10,000. Staff W put the number at $28,671 (2014). While The Knot (2011) reported wedding cost at $26,984; from a survey of more than 18,000 married couples. Just as within India and China significant regional variance was common within America (The Knot, 2011; Reich, 2014). (See appendix D, chart 3.2).

What of real world practices, how much of this expense followed the U.S.’ normative marriage market values systems’ gender specific expense related traditions? DollarSense (1996-97) reported that although wedding expense responsibility; whom was expected to pay for what, was fluid and evolving, traditional expectations predominantly centered on the bride’s parents (pg. 1). Tradition aside, the average bride and groom would reportedly pay for their wedding about 32% of the time, with the bride’s parents covering the expense some 19% of the time.
Further, 15% of wedding costs were reportedly shared by the bride, the groom and their parents. Finally, some 36% of wedding expense responsibilities remained undefined (Sardone, 2011).

In addition, Lin (2012) reported “…45% of the wedding was paid for by the bride’s parents, 42%... by the bride and groom, and 12%... by the groom's parents” (pg. 1). Further, of couples who did pay for their own wedding 13% were reported to have paid the entire cost themselves (Lin, 2012). (See appendix D, chart 3.21)

The cost of the average honeymoon will also be included. XO Group (2011) reported the average honeymoon expense at approximately $4,400; with a low range average of about $2300, an upper average of $6,000, and a more affluent price range average of about $10,000. Staff T (2013) reported an average of between $2,000 and $5,000, with about one third spending $5,000 to $10,000. (See appendix E, chart 3.3).

What are the gender specific social expectations associated with honeymoons, and what are the approximated real world gender specific flows? XO Group (2011) reported that about 62% of honeymooners paid for most of their own honeymoon expenses (+90%) and 14% used a honeymoon registry; similar to a bridal registry. While Travelguard (2012) reported the number at about 61%; additionally, some 14% of couples were reported to have used a honeymoon registry to pay expenses (pg. 1). Finally, Williams (2008) noted that some 70% of couples paid for their own honeymoon. These values will be used for net adjusted MMGEVS ratings data estimates. (See appendix E, chart 3.1)

In addition an average of three sets of economic range values will be determined for the United States. A lower level income (L1), mid-level income (L2) and an upper level income (L3)
will be used; that level of income at which America was demographically split into three groups; the mid-point of each income group, of each 1/3 will be used.

Approximately 1/2 of Americans (sex combined) reportedly made less than $19,000 annually, and the other half made more. Lower 1/3 (L1) income level was $7,900, and the upper 1/3 (L3) was $47,000 (My Percent, 2014; White, Gebeloff & Ford, 2012). (See appendix E, chart 3.4)

Gross MMGEVS ratings for the U.S. follow. Gross average partner price in the U.S. for the middle 1/3 income range (L2) was a resultant 0.5408. Again this value represents a female to male socio-expectational flow, an effective groom price. The gross unadjusted MMGEVS rating for the lower 1/3 income level in the U.S. (L1) was a resultant 0.7405, and the upper 1/3 income level rating (L3) was 0.1918. These values represent a percentage of annual income per capita as well. (L3) represents about 19% of annual individual per capita earnings approximately, (L1) at 0.7045 represents a groom price of approximately 74% of annual per capita earnings, with (L2) rating at about 54% of APCI. (See appendix F, chart 3.5).

Resultant adjusted net MMGEVS ratings data for the U.S. follow. The mid-level income (L2) net rating was 0.2370. With a lower income level value (L1) rating of 0.3220, and an upper income value rating (L3) of 0.0998. Again, these ratings represent U.S. marriage market values system’s approximate adjusted net gender specific real world flows as percentages of annual adjusted per capita income; L1 ± 32%, L2 ± 24% and L3 ± 10%. (See appendix F, chart 3.6 and appendix I, graph 4.0)

Conclusions

Do marriage market gender equity value systems ratings coincide with UN gender inequality index ratings? Is there any semblance of correlation with the MMGEVS data and the
UNGII 2012 data? It would appear that some potential correlation may be in evidence. (See appendix J, graph 5.1)

India scored a net 0.610, China scored a 0.213, and the U.S. scored a 0.256 on the UNGII; a lower value represented greater gender equity while a higher value represented greater levels of gender inequality. In addition, these values presented China, the U.S. and India as patriarchal social constructs. These were the official UN Gender Inequality Index ratings for India, China and America. MMGEVS ratings per this study result with India’s (L1) gross and net ratings of 6.0 and 5.61, (L2) 5.0 and 4.65, and (L3) gross and net ratings of 4.0 and 3.74.

India had the highest MMGEVS ratings; with a gross average cost of a partner in India equaling some 4 to 6 times annual individual earnings. Like the UNGII, a higher rating represents greater gender disparity, unlike the UNGII the MMGEVS rating specifically represents potential gender inequity within the various relative local worldwide marriage market values systems.

In addition, India was officially ranked 160th of the more than 200 plus countries that participate in the UNGII, which represented a significant level of gender inequality as compared with both China and the U.S. (UNGII, 2012). China had ranked ahead of America at 35th internationally, with the U.S. ranking 42nd internationally. How do these data compare with MMGEVS ratings data? (See appendix J, graph 5.1)

The U.S. had the lowest net and gross MMGEVS ratings; with a gross L1 of 0.74 and a net of 0.32. While China had MMGEVS ratings of -1.5 and -1.0, these represent L1 gross and L1 net ratings: The negative value denotes a net opposite gender specific socio-expectational flow, as compared to both the U.S. and India, a male to female gender specific flow. China’s MMGEVS
ratings could in theory represent potential gender inequity for the male within Chinese society, with regards to relative local marriage market values systems. None the less China had been reported as a patriarchal society, and the UNGII data concluded likewise. However, it is possible that China’s negative MMGEVS ratings represent a potential connection to China’s lower gender inequality index rating, as compared to the U.S. and India?

China and America were much closer together on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS surveys. While China bested the U.S. on the UNGII ratings, the U.S. had bested China on the MMGEVS ratings, potentially. This made China and or the U.S. possible outliers within the two data sets. Again, a zero on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS scales would represent fundamental gender equality. (See appendix J, graph 5.1)

Discussion

What does any of this mean? Of what significance is marriage to the human being, as individuals, as couples and as larger collectives, as societies, pursuant to worldwide gender inequality issues? Can relative local marriage market values systems (MMGEVS) ratings be seen as potential predictors for gender specific long term overall wellbeing, a social predictor?

The dowry system itself was a social marker of considerable significance (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004). In addition, dowry, or groom price, was seen as a family investment, in a daughter’s future (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Whereas women could benefit from the dowry system, to some extent, women continue to bear the brunt of the cultural or social difficulties associated with its practice (Banerjee, 2013).

Banerjee (2013) suggested “Dowry death might simply be a result of several factors including marriage patterns (especially hypergamy) …economic dependency of women and
cultural norms” (pg. 41). Amin & Bajracharya (2011) wrote “In particular, the evaluation of
women’s and men’s worth in the marriage market in terms of dowry or bride-price may have…
significant implications for their well-being as adults and for gender equity” (pg. 2).

Furthermore, dowry hyperinflation is being experienced within India’s marriage market.
Putting the commoners, the vast majority of the populace, the women and the men of modest
means, into a very difficult socio-cultural bind (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Banerjee (2013) noted “the
size of the dowry was designed to maintain or further the societal status of families… which had
…transitioned into a ‘groom price’ (Menski, 1998)” (pg. 35).

Subsequently, dowry related violence has been increasing significantly as the practice has
become both more universal and more expensive (Banerjee, 2013). Babu and Babu (2011)
reported that dowry related deaths and dowry-related suicides had risen 74% and 31% from 1995
to 2007 (pg. 38). In addition, Banerjee (2013) reported a 59% increase in overall crimes against
women in India from 2001 to 2011 (pg. 34). Gentleman (2006) noted “An average of one dowry
death is reported every 77 minutes according to the National Crime Record Bureau” (pg. 1).

Furthermore, many cases of dowry violence, and or violence against women, remain unreported
due to various cultural inhibitions much like within China and the U.S. (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004;
Anderson, 2007).

China, which had been reported as having a preference for male children, traditionally, is
experiencing issues not unlike India. A shortage of marriage age appropriate women had resulted
in significant marriage market inflation, a bride price inflation.

Might the male construct be trapped within these confines as well? Those who wish to
marry, start a family and perpetuate the line as it were, would have to pay as much as a years’
worth, or many years’ worth of earnings in order to secure a partner (Jiang & Sanchez-
Barricarte, 2012; Jiang, Guo, Li & Feldman, 2013; Bhat & Halli, 1999). These are the commoners of American, Indian and Chinese society, not the wealthy, or the newly emerging middle classes but the vast majority of the respective populaces. Zhang (2000) reported “Though there was no significant difference in bride price paid by households of various economic groups… richer households paid higher bride prices, but… it was not the poorest who paid the lowest” (pg. 63).

Bride price practice has had, and continues to have an adverse effect on the average Chinese male’s ability to secure a partner, to afford a bride. Jiang et al (2013) added “For the present and in the future, there are and will be millions of young males who are unable to find brides in China (Tuljapurkar et al. 1995; Poston and Glover 2005; Attané 2006; Li et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2007)” (pg. 135).

This is true within the American and the Indian marriage markets. The lower the income bracket the higher the relative local partner price. These costs represent significant social barriers to marriage within each of the sample countries. Whereas, for the wealthiest in China, India or America these social expectational expenses represent each populations lowest relative local partner price, as a percentage of individual annual income.

Partner price in China was less expensive than partner price in India while it was more expensive than in America, about twice as much on average approximately. America had the lowest resultant MMGEVS ratings of the three sample countries; as a percentage of annual income. Although, China had a reverse flow, a male to female flow, the overall gender specific flow differential was larger than that of the U.S.’.

Does this explain the difference in ratings between the U.S. and China, on the two scales, the UNGII and the MMGEVS? Was bride price in China potentially effecting overall gender
inequality within Chinese society, was it acting as a counter force to long established patriarchy? China had rated better than America on the UNGII, meaning that the female within Chinese society enjoyed greater levels of overall gender equality, than did the female in America. None the less, the number one cause of injury to a woman in China was from an intimate partner (XU et al, 2005).

The U.S. marriage market values systems; the U.S.’ culturally accepted and widely practiced marriage related norms would appear to be a system which empowers and condemns. But, like China and India would do so based on normative socially accepted gender specific constructs. In addition, it would appear that this conjugal patriarchal power system may be capable of extending its influence far beyond the confines of the conjugal social construct, beyond the confines of the marriage itself.

Coontz (2004) wrote “For all socio economic classes, marriage was the most important marker of adulthood and respectability” (pg.4). Further, it was said to be an effective way of extracting labor from the young, a means of consolidating basic survival activities, economic, security, and perpetuation. What of marriage in modern times? De Mor & Van Zanden (2009) expressed that “…a household was a cooperative economic unit aimed at the fulfilment of the physical and emotional needs of its members, and characterized by certain inequalities” sexual, generational (pg. 3).

Marriage as an institution in the west had gone through many changes throughout history. Everitt (2012) expressed the importance of strategic alliances; bonds of family, bonds of trust, as the foundations for ever larger alliances, and ever larger strategic collectives- economics and security. Politics would not be far behind, the politics of wealth, nor would religious consecration of the marriage construct (circa 11th & 12th centuries). Modern traditional Judeo-
Christian wedding vows were credited to Thomas Cramer circa 1549; to have and to hold, for better or for worse, for richer or poorer and the like (Everitt, 2012).

The history of marriage in the United States was one of “utilitarian reasoning” as Cott (2000) put it (pg. 10). One in which the founding fathers saw Christian consent based monogamous marriage as a natural extension of this new republican form of governance, government by choice. Cott (2000) continued that it was “…this thinking which propelled the analogy between the two forms of consensual union into the republican nation’s self-understanding and identity” (pg. 10).

It is true that president Obama had said America was no longer just a Christian nation (Obama, 2008). However, some 77 percent of Americans in a recent Gallup poll identified themselves with a Christian religion (Newport, 2012).

Christian based consensual marriage did come to dominate the United States. Many of the utilitarian aspects of this construct would prove useful to society at large, more stable environments for children, effective economic partnering, increased productivity and the like. Marriage had effectively increased the man’s, the husband’s power both in society and in the relationship. The woman would give up her name, her identity to be called by his name; this was legally defined as “coverture”, with the wife being called the “feme-covert” (Cott, 2000 pg. 11). Furthermore, the wife could not own property, conduct legal affairs, sign contracts and the like. The husband did in fact become his wife’s legal and political representative, effectively “…disenfranchising her” as Cott (2000) put it (pg.12).

This was reminiscent of the ancient Roman “house-father” who ruled with absolution; none in the household had any legal rights, not children, not wives, not slaves (as cited in Westermarck, 1968 pg. 137). Whereas it would be the man and the woman consenting...
ostensibly, it was religion, politics, and society setting the rules for the construction of, or for the context of consent; utilitarian, patriarchal (Cott, 2000, Westermarck, 1968).

Marriage was certainly about money, patriarchy and power around the world, just as it had been throughout history (Coontz, 2004). Lamont (2014) noted “…traditional gender ideologies remain remarkably resilient, as courtship conventions symbolizing men’s dominant, breadwinning status stubbornly persist (Eaton and Rose 2011)” (pg. 190). Further, Christianson (2011) reported on gender specific perceptions regarding the financial prudence of a potential partner and noted that 61% percent of men held a positive view of a thrifty blind date; she was “…smart and sexy”, while 66% of women held a negative view; he was “…a turnoff”, and an additional 17% of women found the anonymous thrift minded male boring (pg. 1).

Women have had, historically speaking, a much better chance of marrying up, as compared to men. Patriarchy worked to their favor, for some of them. Until recently however, nowadays more women, than men, are marrying down (Wang, 2014). The marriage market was fluid. Yet patriarchal expectations remained none the less. Lamont (2014) noted “The majority of the women expressed a preference for conventional courtship behaviors and expected men to ask and pay for the first date, confirm the exclusivity of the relationship, and propose marriage” (pg. 197). Is there a feedback loop in effect, potentially seeding more power to the relative local social male construct?

Is the female consenting to subordination, by way of her choosing to participate according to established local customs, and is this a response, conscious or unconscious, to local relative marriage market gender equity values systems, or relative local coupling observances social expectancies? Is the marriage minded female either socially expected to and or willingly acquiescing to normative coupling observance behavioral patterns thereby signaling to the male,
as well as to society at large; religion, friends, family, mentors, her own potential willing subservience?

Lamont (2014) reported “Although women assert that personal choice governs their courtship behavior, their efforts to conceal nonconforming behavior indicated that gendered expectations guide their decision making” (pg. 207). Gross MMGEYS ratings or gender specific traditional expectations of the marriage observance are appurtenant to this type of study; given the power of socio-expectational influence. In addition to the net adjusted approximated real world specific expenditures incurred and by whom. Is this the origin of the potential feedback loop, the power of socio-expectational memes?

What if anything might this data portend? There is the possibility of error or biases within the data sets. There is also the possibility that any potential preliminary correlation might prove to be unsubstantiated in the future. None the less, I believe it to mean that perhaps a closer look at the cause and effect potential of relative local coupling observances, of marriage market values systems worldwide, including America, to be in order.

Further, these results show the potential for this type of an analysis pursuant to addressing gender inequality issues worldwide. Many obstacles prevent the collection and assessment of meaningful data pursuant to gender inequality worldwide, as noted by the United Nations. I believe this type of an assessment may prove to be beneficial.

The UNWW (2010) report noted “Increasing the capacity to produce reliable and timely... gender statistics, remains a formidable challenge for many countries” (pg. XII). The same concern previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan expressed five years earlier in the UNWW (2005) report “Ten years after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action,
the lack of reliable national statistics on gender issues persists in many parts of the world” (pg. III).

It has become common knowledge that women lagged behind men in nearly every statistical category everywhere around the world (UNWW, 2012-2013). Women make less money, work longer hours, own fewer assets and are faced with greater levels of gender specific violence than men (UNWW, 2012-2013).

Although levels and rates of violence against women may have presented considerable local variability, the violence was universal and ongoing. The UNWW (2010) reported “…such abuse occurs in all countries or areas without exception” (pg. X). Gender wealth and or wage inequality is universal and is ongoing as well. Tijdens & Van Klaveren (2012) in an ITUC report on gender pay inequality noted “No significant progress has been made in closing the global gender pay gap for over a decade” (pg. C).

The roots of gender inequality appear to run deep. How can this be a simple matter of relative local cultural differences when it is both a worldwide and a universal ongoing phenomenon? I believe we ought to look to local relative cultural coupling observances’ traditional memes. To marriage market values systems, and to the potential role that they may play in reinforcing widely acknowledged and systemic worldwide gender inequality.
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Appendix A: India data figures

Chart 1.1 India dowry price data; as a percentage of annual income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1 Rural</th>
<th>L2 (L1+L3)/2</th>
<th>L3 Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karnataka</td>
<td>6x</td>
<td>L3: 4x</td>
<td>D: 4x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh dowry</td>
<td>3x</td>
<td>L1: 6x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh dowry</td>
<td>7x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Nadu dowry</td>
<td>8x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross dowry cost</td>
<td>24x/4n</td>
<td>10x/2n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 1.2 India MMGEVS data - Gross unadjusted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1 Rural</th>
<th>L2 Average (L1,L2)</th>
<th>L3 Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross MMGEVS rating</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 1.3 India MMGEVS ratings data, net adjusted, approximated real world practice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1 Rural</th>
<th>L2 Average (L1,L2)</th>
<th>L3 Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross MMGEVS rating</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net MMGEVS rating</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>4.675</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings
Appendix B: China data figures

Chart 2.1 China bride price (BP) data, gross cost, and approximated real world net cost (Yuan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross bride price</td>
<td>15,000y</td>
<td>21,750y</td>
<td>28,500y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real world payment 1 ±50%</td>
<td>± 50%</td>
<td>± 50%</td>
<td>± 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real world payment 2 ±50%</td>
<td>+7,500y*</td>
<td>+10,875 y</td>
<td>+14,250 y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rwp1+rwp2)/2n = net bride price</td>
<td>22,500y/2n</td>
<td>32625y/2n</td>
<td>42,750y/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net bride price</td>
<td>11,250y</td>
<td>16312.5y</td>
<td>21,375y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This value represents an approximated average of the 50% that did not pay full bride price.

Chart 2.2 China per capita annual income (Yuan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,998y</td>
<td>19,499y</td>
<td>29,000y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2.3 China MMGEVS ratings, gross unadjusted, as a percentage of annual income

*A negative MMGEVS rating value denotes a female to male gender specific flow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bride Price</td>
<td>15,000y</td>
<td>21,750y</td>
<td>28,500y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIPC</td>
<td>±9,998y</td>
<td>±19,499y</td>
<td>±29,000y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross MMGEVS rating * M&gt;F</td>
<td>-1.5x</td>
<td>-1.12x</td>
<td>-0.98x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings

Chart 2.4 China MMGEVS; 90% real world practice adjustment, adjusted net bride price data

*A negative MMGEVS rating value denotes a female to male gender specific flow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income level</th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,000y</td>
<td>21,750y</td>
<td>28,500y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This value represents an approximated average of the 50% that did not pay full bride price.
Appendix C: U.S. data figures

Chart 3.1 U.S. engagement ring price data, M/F gross socio-expectational flow (US dollars) M>F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement ring cost</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>$2,311.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement ring cost</td>
<td>+ $2,410.00</td>
<td>+ $5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement ring cost</td>
<td>+ $2,000.00</td>
<td>+ $4,999.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>= $6,721.00/3n</td>
<td>= $15,657.00/3n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>= $2,240.33</td>
<td>$5,219.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross E ring cost</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>$2,240.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Gross adjusted MMGEVS rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1252x</td>
<td>0.8366x</td>
<td>0.7371x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net adjusted value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0127x</td>
<td>0.7529</td>
<td>0.6634x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net MMGEVS rating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1.01x</td>
<td>-0.75x</td>
<td>-0.66x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legends:

x = approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings.

Chart 3.11 U.S. engagement ring price data, net adjusted cost, approximated real world practice
(US dollars) M>F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>55% + 75% /2n</td>
<td>55% + 75% /2n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>= 128%/2n</td>
<td>= 128%/2n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement ring cost</td>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>$2,240.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>$1,000.00/ 64%</td>
<td>$2,240.33/ 64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net E ring cost</td>
<td>$640.00</td>
<td>$1,433.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Gross adjusted MMGEVS rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1252x</td>
<td>0.8366x</td>
<td>0.7371x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net adjusted value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0127x</td>
<td>0.7529</td>
<td>0.6634x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net MMGEVS rating:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1.01x</td>
<td>-0.75x</td>
<td>-0.66x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legends:

x = approximate annual per capita income, ie 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings.
Appendix D: U.S. data figures

Chart 3.2 U.S. gross wedding price data, gross socio-expectational flow (U.S. Dollars) F>M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
<td>$27,600.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>+$27,113.00</td>
<td>+ $25,200.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>+ $28,671.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>+ $26,984.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>=$37,113.00 /2n = $108,455.00 /4n</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement ring gross</td>
<td>-$1,000.00</td>
<td>-$2,240.33</td>
<td>-$5,219.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross adjusted wedding cost</td>
<td>$9,000.00</td>
<td>$16,316.17</td>
<td>$21,894.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Real world practice (US dollars) F>M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>32% + 45%/2n</td>
<td>32% + 45%/2n</td>
<td>32% + 45%/2n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>=77%/2n</td>
<td>=77%/2n</td>
<td>=77%/2n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
<td>$18,556.00</td>
<td>$27,113.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>$10,000.00/38.5%</td>
<td>$18,556.00/38.5%</td>
<td>$27,113.00/38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net wedding cost F&gt;M</td>
<td>$3,850.00</td>
<td>$7,114.06</td>
<td>$10,431.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E U.S. data figures

Chart 3.3 U.S. gross honeymoon price data, gross socio-expectational flow (US dollars) M>F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon cost</td>
<td>$2,300.00</td>
<td>$4,400.00</td>
<td>$6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon cost</td>
<td>+$2,000.00</td>
<td>+$2,000.00</td>
<td>+$10,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honeymoon cost</td>
<td>+$5,000.00</td>
<td>+$5,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>$4,300.00/2n</td>
<td>$11,400.00/3n</td>
<td>$31,000.00/4n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross honeymoon cost</td>
<td>$2,150.00</td>
<td>$3,800.00</td>
<td>$7,750.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.31 U.S. net honeymoon price data, net adjusted cost, approximated real world practice (US dollars) M>F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>-61%+-14%</td>
<td>61%+14%</td>
<td>61%+14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>+62%</td>
<td>+62%</td>
<td>+62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real world practice</td>
<td>+70%</td>
<td>+70%</td>
<td>+70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>=207%/3n</td>
<td>=207%/3n</td>
<td>=207%/3n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>=69%</td>
<td>=69%</td>
<td>=69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>100%-69%</td>
<td>100%-69%</td>
<td>100%-69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net real world practice</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross honeymoon cost</td>
<td>$2,150.00</td>
<td>$3,800.00</td>
<td>$7,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>$2,150.00/31%</td>
<td>$3,800.00/31%</td>
<td>$7,750.00/31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net honeymoon cost</td>
<td>$666.50</td>
<td>$1,178.00</td>
<td>$2,402.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.4 U.S. annual per capita income (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,900</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$47,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F: U.S. Data figures

Chart 3.5 U.S. gross MMGEVS ratings data- Gross unadjusted (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross wedding cost</td>
<td>$9,000.00</td>
<td>$16,316.17</td>
<td>$21,894.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross E. ring cost</td>
<td>-$1,000.00</td>
<td>-$2,240.33</td>
<td>-$5,219.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross honeymoon cost</td>
<td>-$2,150.00</td>
<td>-$3,800.00</td>
<td>-$7,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net flow</td>
<td>$5,850.00</td>
<td>$10,275.84</td>
<td>$9,015.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC income</td>
<td>$7,900.00</td>
<td>$19,000.00</td>
<td>$47,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross MMGEVS rating</td>
<td>0.7405x</td>
<td>0.5408x</td>
<td>0.1918x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual per capita income, ie. 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings.

Chart 3.6 U.S. net MMGEVS ratings data, net adjusted, approximated real world practice (US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L1</th>
<th>L2</th>
<th>L3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net wedding cost</td>
<td>$3,850.00</td>
<td>$7,114.06</td>
<td>$10,431.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net E. ring cost</td>
<td>-$640.00</td>
<td>-$1,433.81</td>
<td>-$3,340.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net honeymoon cost</td>
<td>-$666.50</td>
<td>-$1,178.00</td>
<td>-$2,402.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net flow</td>
<td>$2,543.50</td>
<td>$4,502.25</td>
<td>$4,688.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC income</td>
<td>$7,900.00</td>
<td>$19,000.00</td>
<td>$47,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net MMGEVS rating</td>
<td>0.3220x</td>
<td>0.2370x</td>
<td>0.0998x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: x = approximate annual per capita income, ie. 1x would equal 100% of annual earnings.
Appendix G: India MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating

Graph 1.4 India combined date, MMGEVS & UNGII
Appendix H: China MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating

Graph 2.5 China combined date, MMGEVS & UNGII

China MMGEVS & UNGII

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

-0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3

-1.5 -1.25 -1.01 -0.78 -0.55 -0.32 -0.09 0.18 0.41

x = 100% of AIPC

MMGEVS UNGII 0 = gender equality
Appendix I: U.S. MMGEVS gross and net ratings, and UNGII rating

Graph 4.0 U.S. combined date, MMGEVS & UNGII
Appendix J MMGEVS & UNGII ratings for all sample countries

Graph 5.1 All MMGEVS ratings data and all UNGII ratings data

A positive value denotes a M>F flow, a negative value denotes a F>M flow

Abstract

This study looks at two of humanity's oldest and still predominant conventions, throughout the world: marriage and patriarchy. This work looks at the political economics of predominating marriage practices, at the socio-expectational power and or economic flows and the existence of global gender inequality as defined by the United Nations Gender Inequality Index 2012. Could
there be a potential relationship, some form of correlation, whether cause and effect or the like, between gender power flow dynamics and the political economics of the world’s various local coupling observances, or marriage market gender equity values systems? This study concludes that there would seem to be potentially significant correlation within these two data sets. This finding merits a more comprehensive look at prevailing global, local cultural marriage traditions and their potential effect on the prevalence of worldwide gender inequality.

—— Keywords: marriage market, gender equity, bride price, dowry, groom price, partner price, marriage market gender equity value system (MMGEVS) United Nations Gender Inequality Index (UNGII)

—— Gender equity power flow dynamics, relative local marriage market values systems and worldwide gender inequality. The United Nations (2000, 2005 & 2010) affirmed that gender inequality continued to be a significant issue throughout the world (UNWW). “Despite calls for gender equality, women were significantly under represented in Governments, political parties and at the United Nations” as reported by the UNWW (2000, pg. 151). For example, “7
of 150 elected Heads of State in the world were women, and only 11 of 192 Heads of
Government” (UNWW, 2010 pg. X, para 3).

In an effort to quantify worldwide gender inequality the United Nations had developed the
Gender Inequality Index (2012). This rating, and ranking established a gender inequality score
based on metrics from several other international studies. The UN (2014) noted “The Gender
Inequality Index is similar in method to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
(IHDI). It can be interpreted as a percentage loss to potential human development due to
shortfalls in the dimensions included” (GII FAQ, 2014). Such as, gender specific levels of access
to society, health, economy, and government.

Not one of the more than 200 participant countries had attained a perfect gender equity
score of zero. Gender equity did not exist anywhere on the planet as rated by the United Nations
Gender Inequality Index (UNGII, 2012).

This work will investigate marriage and worldwide gender inequality; the gender power
flow dynamics of culturally relevant local coupling observances, of bride price, dowry, courting,
dating or the like, of marriage market values systems worldwide. What if any potential influence
might these various coupling rituals have on predominant worldwide gender inequality? Whereas
the various marriage associated observances differed considerably throughout the world,
machinery had remained a worldwide phenomenon, as did gender inequality.

The glass slipper and the glass ceiling, are they one and the same? Could they be socially
manufactured derivations of predominating gender constructs, which had emerged from the
many various cultural coupling observances’ deeply embedded traditions? Were these various
cultural coupling observances, or, relative cultural marriage equity market values systems,
serving to perpetuate gender inequality worldwide?
Three fundamental principles represent the theoretical grounding for this research. First, that women were, or that the female gender construct was, subordinate to that of the male gender construct. Second, that both men and women were, for all intents and purposes, a commodity. Finally, that the commodification of men and women through the marriage market, represented a significant social force capable of influencing and perpetuating worldwide systemic gender inequality.

John Locke (circa 1690) exampled man and woman, husband and wife as the first civil society: he expressed the idea that “Conjugal society was made by a voluntary compact between man and woman” (as cited in MacPherson, 1980, pg. 43). In this earliest of societies Locke did cast the male as the leader over the female. A western centric viewpoint was one of democratic ideals, that of a voluntary or equitably agreed upon conjugal society and patriarchy.

Whether or not the many various conjugal societies were or were not voluntary in nature, and to what extent was not at issue for this specific research. At issue was the significance of the observance itself, of relative local marriage market gender equity values systems worldwide pursuant to global gender inequality. This research will not attempt to define voluntary conjugal societies excepting as follows. The persistence of said observance(s) in any given collective, whether official or unofficial, would for the sake of this research render these various coupling observances more or less voluntary in nature.

I would use available data pursuant to the establishment of relative marriage market gender equity value systems worldwide. Various select countries would be used for the sake of comparing and contrasting with this works duly established marriage market gender equity value scale (MMGEVS) data with the United Nations Gender Inequality Index (UNGII, 2012) data.

Comment [PDC5]: Elsewhere (notably the abstract), you use MMGEVS to refer to systems, not scales. Make sure the “S” is consistently applied.
Within the UN Gender Inequality Index (UNGII) there were some potential issues owing to possible western biases. The majority of the countries that scored lower, i.e., better, those collectives which afforded greater levels of female access or equality within their societies, according to the UNGII, were predominantly westernized; capitalist, democratic, developed. Furthermore, the countries or regions which ranked at the lower end of the UNGII scale tended to come from developing, underdeveloped or undeveloped areas primarily. In addition, different cultures could have and did have different values, different priorities. Human rights, women’s rights, gender equity and or women’s access to society did have very different meanings in the many different social collectives around the globe.

The UN report continued with a mention of some limitations of its own data; the UNGII was far from perfect, far from exacting and was limited in scope by numerous factors. Such as, using national governance participation rates rather than local governance participation rates in the index and lacking a broader internationally agreed upon set of standards with which to work on many issues. These and many other difficulties limited the type, the quality and the amount of data collectable, and or usable. None the less the UNGII represented best available data pursuant to a practical measurement of worldwide gender inequality, using metrics which had been agreed to by a large number of countries throughout the world. This data would subsequently be compared with resultant MMGEVS data.

I would establish specific relative local coupling observance prevalence within each preliminary sample country selected for this work. Using these data I would then establish a marriage market gender equity value scale (MMGEVS): How much for the woman, or how much for the man, a partner price? This would be based on socio-expectational economic transfers measured as a percentage of individual annual earnings per capita within each sample.
country. Finally this data would be compared with data from the UNGII 2012 data. Could gender inequality data, as measured by the UNGII, be shown to potentially relate to resultant marriage market gender equity value range data, or to worldwide marriage market gender values systems?

What was the relative marriage market gender equity value range within each sample country? What was the relative gender inequality rating of each sample country, as per the UNGII 2012? And what if any potential corroboration could be found within these two data sets?

Participant countries were selected based on where they were rated on the UNGII 2012 scale; a broad spectrum of ratings was desired, as well as the availability of sufficient data, the specific type of relative local cultural coupling observances practiced; whether bride-price, dowry, westernized dating. Population size was important in that this research was attempting to look at larger worldwide trends. Further, a broad cross section of governance models, social and economic developmental levels, religious practices, and belief systems was desired. I would use India, China and the United States as my preliminary sample countries for this study.

Could relative cultural variance within these coupling observances; whether our own familiar westernized traditional dating and marriage observances, eastern bride-price observances or dowry observances or the like; relative cultural marriage equity market value systems, be shown to correlate with relative global gender inequality worldwide? In any given society in which gender equity (women’s rights) was rated, whether lower or higher, could relative cultural marriage equity market value be shown to potentially correspond with the various levels of gender equity as tracked and rated by the United Nations 2012 Gender Inequality Index (UNGII)?

India will be presented first, China second and the United States third; with respects to culturally specific coupling observances and gender specific economic socio-expectational
flows; as a percentage of annual income within each sample country. These data sets will be used to establish MMGEVS for each sample country. The forth section will be a comparison of the two data sets: The UNGII rating for each of the three sample countries, and the MMGEVS ratings for each sample country. In the final section I will present discussion and conclusion(s).

Marriage equity market gender value range, India

India, dowry payment and marriage market values systems

India was described as a patriarchal society in which “…the powerless position of the woman appeared to be at the core…” (Banerjee, 2014, p.?). The Indian marriage market was dominated by dowry payment (Sautmann 2009), (Gentleman, 2006), (Bhat & Halli, 1999), (Anderson, 2007). This was a reverse form of bride price (groom price) whereby the bride, and or the bride’s family, pay the groom and or the groom’s family. The marriage itself would not take place until or unless the dowry had been paid and even then if the dowry was not deemed sufficient, following the marriage, more would be demanded and or expected.

Furthermore, dowry custom had maintained strong cultural support within India. Dowry had in fact become a commonly observed marriage custom in India affecting some “…93-94% of marriages,” Anderson (2007a) reported Sautmann (2009 pg. 6 para 3). This despite efforts from government; which had officially prohibited Dowry in 1961, local social activists, feminist organizations and the like (Sautmann, 2009; Banerjee, 2014).

The relative marriage market gender equity value scale data for India would seem to have been influenced by an overabundance of women. Which had resulted in bride price deflation, or groom price hyperinflation; as opposed to a shortage of women and an associated bride price hyper-inflation in China’s marriage market values system (in Jian et al., 2012).
This was the result of a marriage squeeze in India (Rao, 1993, Sautmann, 2009) (Bhat & Halli, 1999).

While demographically males did outnumber females, this was not true of marriage age appropriate females, who actually outnumbered marriage age appropriate males. A growing population and shifting economic demographics were among the causes of the rise in practice and price of Dowry in India (Bhat and Halli, 2011). (Anderson, 2007). Reporting on several regions throughout India, Anderson (2007) declared that while exacting figures were not available dowries payments would generally equate to “several times more than total annual household income…” (pg. 155, para 4).

Income from within various regions of India varied considerably this study worked to mitigate these incongruences by using an annual income based comparison of the various regions to establish a relative marriage market gender equity value (MMGEVS) for each sample country. For this study the average annual earnings per capita results represented a base value sought for all selected participant sample countries.

Anderson (2007) reported that the rural region of Uttar Pradesh’s average dowry payment was 7 to 3 times the average annual income of the males in the area. Karnataka averaged 6 times the per capita male annual income of the region. Tamil Nadu were reported as having dowries 8 times annual per capita income while Delhi was reported at 4 time’s annual per capita income (see appendix chart 1.15). Central rural India was reported at 68% of total net household worth, while this value will not be used due to the difficulty in quantifying this in terms of per capita or per individual annual earnings this does represent a significant socio-expectational gender specific expense.
In addition, an average range value will be used for three income categories. Lower median average income, median average income and mean or upper average income will be used in order to establish an estimated MMGEVS across various income levels.

India’s median MMGEVS rating was a 5.34. This value represented a net gender-specific female to male flow, a dowry payment, or groom price payment of 5.334 times approximate regional annual per capita earnings. With a lower median income level value range average of 6.3334 and a mean upper level income value range average of 3.5; or about 6.34 and 3.5 times approximate regional annual earnings per capita (See appendix A—chart 1.2).

China, bride price and marriage market values systems

China had been described as a patrilineal society having a patrilocal marriage system—a bride price system (Jiang & Sanchez-Barricarte, 2012; Zhang, 2000). Bride price was a well-accepted practice in Chinese society. This owing as far back as the Zhou dynasty; circa 1046 BCE to 246 BCE (Britannica, 2013). Jiang and Sanchez (2012) reported “From that period on, the role and function of the bride price has never weakened” (pg. 2). It has in fact not only remained a central core of marriage culture in China but has increased in prevalence as market reforms have been instituted (Zhang, 2000). In addition, there would be no marriage, no official engagement or the like, unless or until the bride price was paid in full and in advance (Jiang & Sanchez, 2012).

"The prevalence of bride price in China was closely related to the surplus of males and the lack of females’ females” (Caldwell, Reddy, & Caldwell, 1983, p.7; Chen, 2004). “... in the marriage market, the side of oversupply will compete for marriage at a cost” as Jiang & Sanchez (2012) noted (pg.3, para 1). Basic supply and demand, females were in short supply, demand was exceedingly high.
Jiang and Sanchez-Barricarte (2012) added “A preference for sons and discrimination against daughters had long existed in China” (pg. 3). Efforts had been made by some Chinese to move beyond bride price observances, affording a more equitable role for the female. None the less, bride price had been increasing steadily in China regardless (Zhang 2000, Jiang & Sanchez, 2012).

Reporting on some of the local outlying rural provinces and or Villages in China, Jiang et al. and Sanchez (2012) and Zhang (2000) provided evidence of overall bride price; in terms of relative cost, and for its existence as a commonly accepted social function. This data would be averaged across other sectors of China with a final value, or average approximate marriage market gender equity value range being the result. This was not meant to be a definitive value, but merely a comparison based value range.

Relative bride price in Zhaocun village of Gansu Province was reported at approximately 15,720 Yuan by the end of the 1990s, up from 2069 in the 1980s. Xiajia village of Heilongjiang Province, China was reported at 28,500 Yuan. In addition Zhang (2000) writing on northern Chinese villages provided “In the early 1980s villagers spent 3000-4000 Yuan to arrange a son’s marriage, while at the time of the study, ten years later, they needed to spend 15,000-26,000 Yuan” (pg. 62).

Finally, in computing the numbers used for comparison with the UNGII data, rising dowry price (groom price) was taken into account. Zhang (2012) reported that while around a forth of dowries brought into the marriage were at least equal to the average bride price payment during the 1980s, the earlier years of reform efforts in China, this number had grown to approximately fifty percent by the end of the 1990s.
Consequently, given corroborating data sets ranging from approximately 15,000 to 28,500 Yuan, these figures will be used, following an adjustment pursuant to dowry or groom price increases. Resulting data represented relative effective bride price range value (MMGEVR) minimum and maximum values. The resultant value range (7500 Yuan and 14,250 Yuan) would then be adjusted as a percentage of the annual income of the populace at large, as reported by the Chinese Family Panel Studies, at Peking University (as cited in Wong, 2013). (See appendix B - chart 2.1)

Which for China was around 2100 US dollars or about 13,122 Yuan (Wong, 2013).

The average annual income in Shanghai, a large industrial coastal province was reported at 29,000 YPY (Yuan per year); while in Gansu, a northern inland province the figure was 11,400 YPY; with 16,247 for an urban family and 9998 YPY for a rural family being reported (Wong, 2013). Therefore these resulting range values, minimum and maximum annual income values (9,998 YPY to 29,000 YPY) will be used. (See appendix B - chart 2.2).

In addition, an average range value will be used for three income categories. Lower median average income, median average income and mean or upper average income levels will be used in order to establish an estimated MMGEVR across various income levels, just as was done with India.

Individual results for China follow. Average bride price (MMV) was 0.5570 times approximate annual per capita earnings. With a lower income level value range average of 1.0878 and an upper income value range average of 0.3751 or about 38 percent of approximate annual earnings. (See appendix B - chart 2.3)

Courting, dating, marriage market values systems and the United States
What of western culture’s marriage customs or traditions. Did a relative local marriage market gender equity value system exist, in some form, within the developed world, within the U.S.? Did America have a bride price system, a dowry system or a socio-expectational gender neutral marriage market value system, in practice?

MMGEVR estimations would include formative conjugal society related expense items; considered normative pursuant to coupling observances in America; courtship, engagement ring, wedding ceremony and honeymoon expenses. Relative local U.S. social expectations versus relative U.S. social realities would be divided by annual income per capita ([E/R]/I). What were the actual expenses incurred and or exchanged within the actual practice of the culture in question? What was the net resultant gender specific marriage related expectational economic flow relative to annual income?

In addition an average of three sets of economic range values would be used. Lower median income average, median income average and mean or upper level income average would be used just as was done with India and China.

The average length of engagement in America was reported at about fourteen months and seventeen months (The Knot, 2011), (People, 2007). What of courting costs? Whereas the male would initially incur the bulk of dating expenses, these expenses were generally shared more evenly as a relationship progressed. Evidence suggested that individuals would spend as much or more prepping themselves for a date; on clothing, hair, makeup, than they would on the actual date itself (Whitelocks, 2014). For the sake of this study the expense of courting was excluded; the expense was found to be more a gender neutral flow. Wedding expenses and associated costs remained to be examined.
Cost of the average engagement ring in America was reported at $2,311.00 for 2013 and $2,100 for 2006 (Amex staff 2014). People (2007). Pardes (2014) cited data from American Express Spending & Savings Tracker which reported, of some 1500 adults surveyed about 25 percent expressed $2,000 to $4,999 sufficient, 38 percent intended to spend $1,000 dollars or less; the most common price range, and in the upper income levels the costs increased significantly (Feb, 10). Data from Diamondcode.com’s real time diamond ring purchase price charts corroborated; although, these diamond ring purchase data do not represent engagement rings exclusively, they do represent an economic demographic purchasing pattern comparable to that of the (Staff Amex, 2014) data. And lastly, Farrell (2008) denoted the average engagement ring cost at between $3000.00 and $4000.00 dollars (para 2). There will be the figures used for MMGEVR computations; as an overall positive economic transfer from the male social construct towards the female social construct. (See appendix C - Chart 3.1).

In addition to these costs there is the wedding ceremony itself. Which This must be included, in order to maintain relative consistency across sample countries.

The average cost of a wedding in 2012 was $27,427 dollars, while the median was reported at $16,886 dollars (Oremus, June 12, 2013 pg. 2 para 2). Staff C reported the average cost of a wedding in America at $25,200, and added that most weddings cost less than $10,000 (2014). Staff W put the number at $28,671 (2014). While The Knot (2011) reported $26,984; from its Real Wedding Survey, a survey of more than 18,000 couples who were married in 2010. And also noted significant regional variance with NYC as the most expensive region for marriage at some $70,030 and Utah as the least expensive at around $13,214 (The Knot, 2011).

These will be the figures applied to MMGEVR computations; as an overall positive economic
transfer, from the female social construct towards the male social construct. (See appendix C-chart 3.2). These figures represented gross socio-expectational expenses.

What of real world practices, how much of this expense followed the U.S.’ normative marriage market value system’s gender specific expense related traditions? DollarSense (1996/97) reported that although wedding expense responsibility, whom was expected to pay for what, was fluid and evolving, expectations predominantly centered on the bride’s parents (pg. 1-para 2). Tradition aside, the average bride and groom would pay for the wedding about 32 percent of the time and the bride’s parents 19 percent of the time (Sardone, 2011). Further, 15 percent of wedding costs were shared by bride, groom and their parents, and some 36 percent of wedding expense responsibilities remained undefined (Sardone, 2011).

Lin (2012) cited “…TheKnot.com & WeddingChannel.com 2010 Real Weddings Study, 45% of the wedding was paid for by the bride's parents, 42%... by the bride and groom and 12%... by the groom's parents” (pg. 1-para 4). In addition, of couples who did pay for their own wedding, some 13% reported to have paid all expenses (Lin, 2011). (See appendix C-chart 3.2).

The cost of the average honeymoon would likewise be included. XO Group (2011) reported the average honeymoon expense at approximately $4,400, with a low range average of about $2,300, an upper average of $6,000.00 and a more affluent range average of about $10,000.00 dollars. Staff T (2011) reported an average of between $2,000.00 and $5,000.00 with about one third spending $5,000.00 to $10,000.00. (See appendix C-chart 3.3).

What were the gender specific social expectations associated with honeymoons, what were the approximated real world gender specific flows? X-O Group (2011) reported that about 62% of honeymooners paid for most of their own honeymoon expenses (+90%). While Travelguard (2012) reported the number at about 61%. Additionally, some 14% of couples reportedly had...
used a honeymoon registry to pay expenses (Travelguard, 2012). Finally, Williams (2008) noted some 70% of couples paid for their own honeymoon. (See appendix C–chart 3.3).

A lower level median, mid level median income and mean upper level income would be used; that level of income at which America was demographically split into thirds; the mid point of each income group, of each 1/3 would be used. Approximately 49.9% percent of Americans (sex combined) made less than $19,000 annually and the other approximate 50% made more. (See appendix C–chart 3.4).

Resultant MMGEVS data for the U.S. follow. Mid level median income range MMGEVS was 0.2234. With a lower income level value range average of 0.4213, and a mean upper income value range average of 0.0962. Just as with China and India, these data figures represented U.S. marriage market values system’s approximated net gender specific real world flows as percentages of annual adjusted per capita income. (See appendix D–chart 3.5).

Conclusions:

Did marriage market gender equity value ranges coincide with gender inequality, potentially? Was there any potential semblance of correlation with the MMGEVR data and the UNGII 2012 data? It would appear that some potential correlation may have been in evidence.

India scored a 0.610 respectfully, China scored a 0.213 and the U.S. scored a 0.256: A lower value represented greater gender equity while a higher value represented greater levels of gender inequality. These were the official UN Gender Inequality Index ratings for India, China and America.

In addition, India was officially ranked 160th of the more than 200 plus countries that had participated, which represented a significantly higher level of gender inequality as compared with both China and the U.S. (UN Gender, 2012). China had ranked ahead of America at 35th.
internationally, with the U.S. ranking 42nd internationally. How do these data compare with MMGEVS data? (See appendix E)

The U.S. had the lowest MMGEVS rating, 0.42, compared with India’s 6.34. While China scored a 1.09. This value denoted a net opposite gender-specific socio-expectational flow, a male to female gender-specific flow. Of the three preliminary sample countries, India had scored the highest on the UNGII and the MMGEVS surveys; owing to greater levels of gender inequity within Indian society in general. China and America were much closer together on both surveys, with China besting the U.S. on the UNGII and the U.S. besting China on the MMGEVS. This made either China or the U.S. a potential outlier scoring the lowest on the UNGII, of sample countries. While rating between both India and America within the MMGEVS data, zero on both the UNGII and the MMGEVS scales would represent fundamental gender equality. (See Appendix E)

India had the highest resultant net gender-specific socio-expectational flow differential on the MMGEVS while also having the highest UNGII score; this represented the greatest levels of gender inequality among sample countries within both studies. These numbers represented a political economic rating, or a partner price; a groom price or a bride price. In the case of India, this was a socio-expectational flow from the female construct to the male construct, an effective groom price. Like India the United State had an effective groom price as well.

Discussion

What could any of this mean? Of what significance was marriage to the human being, as individuals, as couples and as larger collectives, as societies, pursuant to worldwide gender inequality issues? Could relative local marriage market values systems, MMGEVS be seen as potential predictors for gender specific long term overall wellbeing, a social predictor?
The dowry system itself was a social marker of considerable significance (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004). In addition, dowry, or groom price, was seen as a family investment, in a daughter’s future (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Whereas a woman could benefit from the dowry system, to some extent, women continued to bear the brunt of the cultural or social difficulties associated with its practice (Banerjee, 2009).

Banerjee (2014) suggested “Dowry death might simply be a result of several factors including marriage patterns (especially hypergamy) ... economic dependency of women and cultural norms” (pg. 41). Bajracharya, & Amin (2011) would posit that “In particular, the evaluation of women’s and men’s worth in the marriage market in terms of dowry or bride-price may have... significant implications for their well-being as adults and for gender equity” (pg. 2 para.1).

Furthermore, dowry hyperinflation was being experienced within India’s marriage market. Putting the commoners, the vast majority of the populace, the women and the men of modest means, into a very difficult socio-cultural bind (Bhat & Halli, 1999). Banerjee (2014) noted “the size of the dowry was designed to maintain or further the societal status of families... which had ...transitioned into a ‘groom price’” (Menski, 1998.)” (pg. 35, para 1).

Subsequently, dowry related violence had been increasing significantly as the practice had become both more universal and more expensive (Banerjee, 2014). Babu and Babu (2011) reported that dowry related deaths and dowry-related suicides had risen seventy four and thirty one percent (from 1995 to 2007) (pg. 38). In addition, Banerjee reported a fifty nine percent increase in overall crimes against women in India from 2001 to 2011 (pg. 34). Gentleman (2013) noted “An average of one dowry death was reported every 77 minutes according to the National Crime Record Bureau” (para 5). Furthermore, many cases of dowry violence, and or violence...
against women, remained unreported due to various cultural inhibitions much like within China and the U.S. (Srinivasan & Lee, 2004; Anderson, 2007).

—— While China, which had been reported as having a preference for male children, traditionally, was experiencing issues not unlike India. A shortage of marriage age appropriate women had resulted in significant marriage market inflation, a bride price inflation.

—— Those who wished to marry, start a family and perpetuate the line as it were, would be forced to borrow and or pay many years’ worth of earnings in order to secure a bride. These were the commoners of Chinese society, not the wealthy or newly emerging middle class but the vast majority of China’s populace. As Zhang (2000) reported “Though there was no significant difference in bride price paid by households of various economic groups… richer households paid higher bride prices, but…. it was not the poorest who paid the lowest” (pg. 63).

—— Bride price had had an adverse effect on the average Chinese male’s ability to secure a partner, to afford a bride. Jin, Guo, Liu and Li (2013) added “For the present and in the future, there are and will be millions of young males who are unable to find brides in China (Tuljapurkar et al., 1995; Poston and Glover, 2005; Attané, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2007)” (pg. 135 para 1).

—— Partner price in China was significantly less expensive than partner price in India while it was more expensive than in America, about twice as much on average approximately. America had the lowest MMGEVR differential of the three sample countries; as a percentage of annual income while ranking second on the UNGII to China. The U.S. also had a female to male gender specific socio-expectational flow of goods and or services, just as in India.

—— Finally, China had the lowest, or the best score on the UNGII and was the only sample country with a net male to female gender specific socio-expectational flow, an effective partner
price, or bride price. None the less, the number one cause of injury to a woman in China was from an intimate partner (Xu, Zhu, O’Campo, Koenig, Mock and Campbell, 2005). This was true of India and America as well.

The U.S. marriage market values system; the U.S.’ culturally accepted and widely practiced marriage related norms, courting or dating system, would appear to be a system which empowered and condemned. And, like China and India, one that would do so based on normative socially accepted gender specific constructs. In addition, it would appear that this conjugal patriarchal power system might be capable of extending its influence far beyond the confines of the conjugal social construct, beyond the confines of the marriage itself.

Coontz (2004) wrote “For all socio economic classes, marriage was the most important marker of adulthood and respectability” (pg.4 para 9). Further, it was said to be an effective way of extracting labor from the young, a means of consolidating basic survival activities, economic, security, and perpetuation. What of marriage in modern times? De Mor & Van Zanden (2009) expressed that “...a household was a cooperative economic unit aimed at the fulfilment of the physical and emotional needs of its members, and characterized by certain inequalities” sexual, generational (pg. 3 para 2).

Marriage as an institution in the west had gone through many changes throughout history. Everitt (2012) cited the importance of strategic alliances; bonds of family, bonds of trust, as the foundations for ever larger alliances, and ever larger strategic collectives - economics and security. Politics would not be far behind, the politics of wealth, nor would religious consecration of the marriage construct (circa 11th & 12th centuries). Modern traditional Judeo-Christian wedding vows were credited to Thomas Cramer circa 1549; “...to have and to hold, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer.”
The history of marriage in the United States was one of “utilitarian reasoning” as Cott (2000) put it (pg. 10 para 2). One in which the founding fathers saw Christian consent-based monogamous marriage as a natural extension of this new republican form of governance, government by choice. Cott (2012) continued that it was “this thinking which propelled the analogy between the two forms of consensual union into the republican nation’s self-understanding and identity” (pg. 10 para 2).

It was true that president Obama had said America was no longer just a Christian nation (Obama, 2008). However, some 77 percent of Americans in a recent Gallup poll identified themselves with a Christian religion (Newport, 2012).

Christian based consensual marriage did come to dominate the United States. While many of the utilitarian aspects of this construct would prove useful to society at large: more stable environments for children, effective economic partnering, increased productivity and the like. It had effectively increased the man’s, the husband’s power both in society and in the relationship. The woman would give up her name, her identity to be called by his name; this was legally defined as “coverture”, with the wife being called the “feme covert” (Cott, 2000 pg. 11 para 3). Furthermore, the wife could not own property, conduct legal affairs, sign contracts and the like. The husband did in fact become his wife’s legal and political representative, effectively “…disenfranchising her” as Cott (2000) put it (pg. 12 para 1).

This was reminiscent of the ancient Roman “house father” who ruled with absolution, none in the household had any legal rights, not children, not wives, not slaves (as cited in Westermarck, 1968 pg. 137, para 2). Whereas it would be the man and the woman consenting ostensibly, it was religion, politics, and society setting the rules for the construction of, or for the context of the consent-utilitarian, patriarchal (Cott, 2000; Westermarck, 1968).
Marriage was certainly about money, power and survival around the world, and throughout history and America was no exception (Coontz, 2005). Lamont (2014) noted “...traditional gender ideologies remain remarkably resilient, as courtship conventions symbolizing men’s dominant, breadwinning status stubbornly persist (Eaton and Rose 2011)” (2014 pg. 190, para 1). Further, Christensen (2011) reported on gender perceptions regarding the financial prudence of a potential partner and noted that 61% percent of men held a positive view of a thrifty blind date, she was “…smart and sexy”, while 66% of women held a negative view, he was “…a turnoff”; and an additional 17% of women called the anonymous thrift-minded male boring (para 6).

Women had had, historically speaking, a much better chance of marrying up, compared to men—patriarchy could work to their favor, some of them. Until recently, nowadays more women than men, are marrying down (Wang, 2014). The marriage market was fluid. Yet patriarchal expectations remained none the less. Was there a feedback loop in effect, potentially seeding more power to the relative local social male construct? Lamont (2014) noted “The majority of the women expressed a preference for conventional courtship behaviors and expected men to ask and pay for the first date, confirm the exclusivity of the relationship, and propose marriage” (pg. 197 para 3).

Was the female consenting, by way of her choosing to participate according to established local customs, could this be a response, conscious or unconscious, to local relative marriage equity market range value, or marriage market values systems social expectancies? In being expected to and or willingly acquiescing to normative coupling observance behavioral patterns thereby signaling to the male, as well as to society at large; religion, friends, family, mentors, her own potential willing subservience.
Lamont (2014) reported “Although women asserted that personal choice governed their courtship behavior, their efforts to conceal nonconforming behavior indicated that gendered expectations guided their decision-making” (pg. 207, para 1). In fact, gender-specific traditional expectations of the American marriage observance were possibly more suitable for use in this study than the actual specific expenditures incurred and by whom. Was this the origin of the potential feedback loop?

What if anything could any of this portend? There is the possibility of error or biases within the data sets. There is also the possibility that any potential preliminary correlation might prove to be unsubstantiated in the future. None the less, I believe it to mean that perhaps a closer look at the cause and effect potential of relative local coupling observances, of marriage-market values systems worldwide, including right here in America to be in order.

Further, these results show the potential for this type of an analysis pursuant to addressing gender inequality issues worldwide. Many obstacles prevent the collection and assessment of meaningful data pursuant to gender inequality worldwide, as noted by the United Nations. I believe this type of an assessment may prove the potential for to be beneficial.

The UNWW 2010 report noted “Increasing the capacity to produce reliable and timely... gender statistics, remains a formidable challenge for many countries” (pg. XII para. 7). The same concern previous UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2005) had expressed five years earlier in the UNWW 2005 report, “Ten years after the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the lack of reliable national statistics on gender issues persisted in many parts of the world” (pg. III).

It had become common knowledge that women lagged behind men in nearly every statistical category everywhere around the world (UNWW, 2014). Women made less money,
worked longer hours, owned fewer assets and were faced with greater levels of gender specific violence than men (UNWW 2012).

Although levels and rates of violence against women may have represented considerable local variability the violence was universal and ongoing. The UNWW (2010) reported “…such abuse occurs in all countries or areas without exception” (pg. X, para 6). Gender wealth and or wage inequality was universal and was ongoing as well. Tijdens & Van Klaveren (2012) in an ITUC report on gender pay inequality noted “No significant progress has been made in closing the global gender pay gap for over a decade” (pg. C).

The roots of gender inequality would appear to run deep. How could this be a simple matter of cultural difference when it was both a worldwide and a universal ongoing phenomenon? Perhaps it was time to consider looking to root local relative cultural coupling observances’ traditions... To to marriage market values systems, and the potential role that they may play in reinforcing widely acknowledged and systemic worldwide gender inequality.
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Appendix A—Data figures India

Chart 1.1 India dowry price data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.334</td>
<td>5.334</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low               Median              Mean  
(3+7/2)          (7+3)+6           (3+4)/2  
=5+6+8/3          =16/3              =3.5  
=19/3              =11/2  
=6.334             =5.334

Chart 1.2 India MEMGVR score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income level</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEMGVR Score</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B—Data figures China

Chart 2.1 China bride price data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15,000y</td>
<td>21,750y</td>
<td>28,500y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,500y</td>
<td>10,875y</td>
<td>14,250y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2.2 Per capita income China (annual)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$9,998</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>$29,000 Ypy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chart 2.3 China MMGEVR data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income level</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC Income</td>
<td>$9,998</td>
<td>$10,500</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M &gt; F</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$10,875</td>
<td>$14,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value %</td>
<td>108.78%</td>
<td>55.77%</td>
<td>37.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMGEVR</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: percentage of annual income X *100%, - negative value

denotes M > F flow

Appendix C—Data figures U.S.
Chart 3.1 Engagement ring price data, M/F socio-expectational economic flow (adjusted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,000.00</td>
<td>$3,250.00</td>
<td>$5,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$71.3%</td>
<td>$71.3%</td>
<td>$71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$713.00</td>
<td>$2,317.25</td>
<td>$4,099.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.2 Wedding price data, F/M socio-expectational economic flow (adjusted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10,000.00</td>
<td>$17,000.00</td>
<td>$22,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$11.6%</td>
<td>$11.6%</td>
<td>$11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,160.00</td>
<td>$7,072.00</td>
<td>$9,256.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.3 Honeymoon price data, M/F socio-expectational flow (adjusted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$2,150.00</td>
<td>$4,099.00</td>
<td>$6,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10.84</td>
<td>$10.84</td>
<td>$10.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$233.06</td>
<td>$509.48</td>
<td>$731.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ex. 3.3: 100% = (61+14+62+14+70+14)/3
\[ \text{_____} = 21.67\% / 2 \]
\[ \text{_____} = 10.84\% \]

Chart 3.4 Per capita income U.S. (annual)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower 1/3</th>
<th>Median 1/3</th>
<th>Mean 1/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$7,900</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$46,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D--Data figures U.S. continued
### Chart 3.5 MMGEVR data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>L-1/3</th>
<th>M-2/3</th>
<th>U-3/3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APC Income</td>
<td>$7,900</td>
<td>$19,000</td>
<td>$46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net F&gt;M</td>
<td>$3314</td>
<td>$4245</td>
<td>$4425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMGVR %</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>0.4213</td>
<td>0.2334</td>
<td>0.0962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Legend: percentage of annual income $x \times 100\%$; negative value denotes M > F flow

Ex. L-1/3: $4160.00 - $713.00 + $233.06

$= 3213.94$ p.m.

$\approx 3214.00/7,900$

$x = 0.4194 \approx 42\%$
Appendix E: comparative data

UNGII Legend: 0 = gender equality, 0 = male gender inequality, +0 = Female gender inequality

MMGEVS Legend: X x APCI; 0 = gender neutral economic flow, 0 = M > F flow, +0 = F > M flow