Title
Management Compensation, Insider Trading and Lobbying Choice: The Case of R & D
Publication Date
1-1-1990
Abstract
In this study we examine the consistency between lobbying choices and insider trading behaviour by managers before and after the issuance of the 1974 FASB Exposure Draft on R&D. The results, though not very strong, indicate that managers compensated by accounting-based schemes lobbied against the FASB 1974 Exposure Draft on R&D and sold the shares of their firms, while managers compensated by market-based schemes lobbied for and bought shares of their firms. These results provide additional evidence that managers' lobbying choice can act as a surrogate for their beliefs as reflected in their insider trading behaviour. © 1990, SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
Publication Title
Australian Journal of Management
Disciplinary Repository
SSRN
Volume
15
Issue
2
First Page
297
Last Page
314
DOI
10.1177/031289629001500205
Open Access Status
OA Disciplinary Repository
Recommended Citation
Feroz, Ehsan H. and Hagerman, Robert L., "Management Compensation, Insider Trading and Lobbying Choice: The Case of R & D" (1990). Business Publications. 166.
https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/business_pub/166
Source Full-text URL
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1170583
